




The Dissertation Committee for Jae-Young Lee
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Three Essays On Bill-and-Keep Payment Mechanisms
Between Communication Networks
Committee:





Three Essays On Bill-and-Keep Payment Mechanisms
Between Communication Networks
by
Jae-Young Lee, B.A., M.A.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
August 2004
Dedicated to my parents, JongGeun Lee and ByungSoo Lee
and
my wife, HyunKyung Kim.
Acknowledgments
I am very grateful to my dissertation supervisor, Dr. David Sibley for
his thoughtful guidance and astute insight. His has an inborn talent for teach-
ing, of which I have greatly benefited since I met him. Without his invaluable
help, this dissertation would not have started. I am also very thankful for the
support of the other dissertation committee members. A debt of gratitude
is owed to Dr. Thomas Wiseman for his willingness to guide and to assist
whenever necessary. He played a role of supervisor while Dr. Sibley was out
of Austin because of his duty at the U.S. Department of Justice. I am very
indebted to Dr. Ken Hendricks for his comments and keen insights. His crucial
suggestions made my papers grow and mature. I thank Dr. Don Fullerton for
reading my papers carefully and correcting many errors. I very much appre-
ciate Dr. Andrew Whinston’s practical insights from industry, which helped
me define a direction for future research.
Colleagues at the University of Texas at Austin have been a great help
throughout my study. In particular, I would like to thank SeokHoon Lee,
JaeJoon Han and Min-Kyu Song for valuable discussions and help on mathe-
matics. SeokHoon Lee especially helped me with the perplexing mathematics
of my models. I am grateful to JungMin Lee, EunSook Seo and MyungHo
Paik for useful suggestions on my papers.
I wish to thank my Master’s degree supervisor, Dr. Hak-Yong Rhee,
from Korea University. I began to dream of study in U.S. when I was his
student. The impression he made on me as a scholar has been one of my
v
strongest motives throughout my academic career and until now, and I know
it will continue to be so even in the future.
I would like to thank my father, JongGeun Lee, and mother, ByungSoo
Lee, for their endless love and support. I am grateful to my mother-in-law,
HyunSang Cho, for taking great care of my family. I am very indebted to my
brother, JaeJeong Lee, and his wife DoGyung Lee, for their wonderful support
during my entire graduate career. I thank my sister-in-law, HyunJung Kim
for willingness to come to Austin from Rochester and for supporting my wife’s
postpartum care for my daughter.
Finally, I wish to thank my family for sharing my graduate days in
Austin. I am deeply indebted to my wife, HyunKyung, for her support and
understanding. I also thank my son, SeungHa, and my daughter, Joan, for
giving me the pleasure of being a father.
vi




The University of Texas at Austin, 2004
Supervisor: David S. Sibley
In many countries, the payment structure in the telecommunications
market is based on the Calling Party Pays Principle (CPP), in which only
callers pay for calls. Since the CPP model has been generally accepted, lit-
tle attention has been paid to the fact that call-receivers benefit from the
calls without having to pay, except in telecommunications studies in 1970s.
This “call externality” has been examined recently in research dealing with
the Receiver Pays Principle (RPP). In this paper, I study the interconnec-
tion between a regulated fixed-line network and competitive mobile networks.
Previous literature says that, under the CPP regime, mobile networks have
an incentive to charge monopoly access charges, the profits from which are
used to attract their own subscribers. However, taking into consideration the
receiver’s utility reduces the mobile networks’ incentive for above-cost access
charges. I consider this phenomenon to be a welfare transfer from fixed-line
users to mobile users. I show that the welfare transfer is reversed as mobile
networks take into account the receiving-utility of their own subscribers. This
vii
reversed welfare effect increases with the size of the receiver’s utility. How-
ever, the market outcome is still inefficient because the mobile access charges
are not sufficiently low given the receiver’s utility. These results urge the in-
troduction of a different payment regime into the telecommunications market
to incorporate call externalities and remove access market distortions. I show
that by introducing a new regime, “Bill-and-Keep”, which includes a Receiving
Party Pays system and no access charges, efficient allocation can be achieved.
Proper meet-points corresponding to receiver’s utilities are required for the
efficient allocation. Theoretically, if a regulator is able to collect information
about the costs of networks and the receiver’s utility, an optimal Bill-and-Keep
regime can be introduced to the economy. But, because it’s nearly impossible
to obtain this information, two practical Bill-and-Keep regimes are suggested:
Central Office Bill-and-Keep and Meet-Point Bill-and-Keep. They only re-
quire information about transport costs, which are relatively easy to detect.
Using a example model, I examine the welfare effect of the practical Bill-and-
Keep regimes for a range of values for the receiver’s utility. I show that for
a Bill-and-Keep regime to be superior to a CPP regime the receiver’s utility
should be fairly large. When receiver’s utility is small, a practical Bill-and-
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Chapter 1
The Role of Receiver’s Utility in the Mobile
Access Market
1.1 Introduction
The US telecommunications market has an unusual payment structure
compared with other telecommunications markets in Asia and Europe. In
particular, the fixed rates for local calls and Mobile Party Pays (MPP) system
are different from the systems used in other countries. In the US MPP system
both callers and receivers pay for the calls, whereas in most European and
Asian countries receivers do not pay at all.
In the traditional research on the telecommunications market, the ‘Call-
ing Party Pays Principle (CPP)’, also known as ‘Calling Party Network Pays
Principle (CPNP),’ is the usual regime.1 This system assumes that a call
gives utility to the calling party but not to the called party. Therefore the
caller or calling network has to pay all the cost of a call including the access
charge, which compensates the called network. Even though receivers enjoy
utility from receiving calls, their utilities are disregarded, ignoring the issue of
“call externalities.” Since under CPP regime receivers do not pay commensu-
rate with their benefit, there may be a distortion of the market equilibrium,
especially in the volume of calls or the usage of telecommunications facilities.
1See Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) and Armstrong (1998).
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This paper expands upon the existing research on the determination
of access pricing between fixed-line and mobile networks. Wright (2002a) and
Armstrong (2002a) provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical fact
that fixed-to-mobile access charges are much higher than mobile-to-fixed ac-
cess charges. In the traditional models, the payment structure of the telecom-
munications market is based on the CPP. It is usually assumed that the mobile
market is perfectly competitive, but that each mobile network has a monopoly
over delivering calls to its subscribers.2 As a result, each mobile network sets
a monopoly access charge for fixed-to-mobile access. On the other hand, the
fixed-line network is assumed to be a regulated monopoly. It is also usually
assumed that their retail prices and access charges are regulated, too. In most
cases, even if competition in the mobile market for subscribers is intense and
mobile networks do not have super-normal profits, the monopoly profits from
call termination and the consequent deadweight loss persist and are used to
finance subsidized retail tariffs to attract subscribers. Even though they do
not emphasize the welfare distribution among agents, one can also see that
high access charges increase the welfare transfer from fixed-line users to mo-
bile users.
However, these papers have some limitations. Because Wright (2002a)
and Armstrong (2002a) accept CPP, they neglect the call externality issue.
This issue had been raised earlier3 and forgotten and only recently has been
picked up again. In particular, Jeon, Laffont and Tirole (2004) introduce
the Receiver Pays Principle (RPP) into the traditional network competition
model of Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b). This paper does not study the
2This service cannot be replaced by other networks if its subscribers do not subscribe to
any other networks simultaneously.
3See Squire (1973) and Rohlfs (1974).
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fixed-mobile access market directly but studies interconnection between two
symmetric networks. Furthermore, the paper focuses on receiver’s prices in-
stead of access charges so that common access charges are assumed to be
given.
In Wright (2002a), he analyzes ‘receiver cares’ in an extended model.
He shows that when the receiver’s utility is considered by networks, this brings
access charges below the monopoly level. If mobile networks take into ac-
count the receiving-utility of their own subscribers, which decreases as access
charges are increased, they will accept “perceived” termination costs, which
are marginal costs discounted by the marginal receiving-utility.
I study the comparative statics of receiver’s utility in mobile access
markets, which is extended from Wright (2002a)’s idea. I set up a traditional
interconnection model between two competitive mobile networks and a regu-
lated monopoly fixed-line network under a CPP regime comparable to Wright
(2002a). All mobile firms can set the retail tariffs and access charges freely but
prices under the fixed-line network are regulated. Because this paper focuses
on access markets between the fixed-line network and the two mobile networks,
mobile-to-mobile and on-net calls are ignored. I introduce the receiver’s util-
ity into the model, however the networks do not charge receivers for incoming
calls. Evaluation of the model clearly demonstrates the existence of call exter-
nalities under the CPP regime. I analyze how the receiver’s utility affects the
welfare distribution from fixed-line users to mobile users. The main question
is how mobile networks respond to the increasing receiving-utility of their own
subscribers and how the welfare is distributed among fixed-line users, mobile
users and mobile networks.
I show that, in a market equilibrium, as the receiving-utility of mobile
3
users increases, mobile networks decrease their access charges from the tra-
ditional monopoly level. This means that the welfare transfer from fixed-line
users to mobile users is reversed as the receiving-utility increases. I find that in
cases when the receiver’s utility is smaller than the caller’s utility, the mobile
networks continue to set access charges above the “technical” marginal cost
but below the traditional monopoly level. Even though the access charges de-
crease because of the inclusion of receiving-utility, the resulting access charge
continues to be inefficiently high, because mobile networks keep the access
monopoly. On the other hand, if the regulator does not know how large the
receiving-utility of fixed-line users is, the regulatory inefficiency for fixed-line
access charges is unavoidable. These two inefficiencies create a necessity for a
new payment regime in telecommunications market – one that will incorporate
call externalities and remove access market distortions.4
1.2 The Model
Assume that the telecommunications market has only two kinds of net-
works: fixed-line and mobile. The fixed-line network is a monopoly and the
mobile market has two symmetric and competitive firms.5 The payment sys-
tem of the telecommunications market is the CPP system, which means that
callers pay for the calls. In the traditional telecommunications models under
CPP, callers are assumed to be the only party to benefit from the calls; how-
ever, receivers clearly benefit from the calls, too. Note that because under
the CPP regime receivers do not pay for their benefits, call externalities arise.
To show the call externalities explicitly, I assume that receivers derive utility
4See DeGraba (2000) and Atkinson and Barnekov (2000) for new regimes.
5This model is based on Wright (2000).
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from the calls but do not pay for calls and that they do not hang up on the
calls first. Therefore, the callers determine the call length.6





Mobile 1 Mobile 2
(receiving-utility) (calling-utility) (receiving-utility)↓ ↑ ↑ ↓
Subscribers Subscribers
All calls made from mobile networks are terminated on the fixed-line
network, and all calls originating on the fixed-line network are terminated on
one of the mobile networks. On-net calls in each network are disregarded7 and
mobile-to-mobile calls are ignored. Since they need access to each other’s net-
work to complete their outgoing calls, two-way access markets exist: mobile-
to-fixed and fixed-to-mobile.
The costs to complete calls are assumed to be composed of three parts:
origination, termination and transport (see Figure 1.2).8 Origination cost co
6See Jeon et al. (2004) for ‘receiver’s sovereignty’ under Receiver Pays Principle.
7See Armstrong (2002a) for a model with on-net calls.
8For telecommunications study, the concept of marginal cost needs to be cared specially
since recently it is generally accepted that the marginal cost of telecommunications service
is almost zero. The marginal costs can be thought as “costs of preparation” to provide
the telecommunications service rather than costs of providing the service itself because
an additional call induces congestion and therefore requires additional capacity. See U.K.
Parliament (1999).
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is a per-minute cost generated in the mobile network when a subscriber makes
a call. The termination cost ct is a per-minute cost generated in the mobile
network when one of its subscribers receives a call. The two mobile networks
have symmetric cost structures. The fixed-line network has a different cost
structure than the mobile networks. CO and CT are, respectively, the orig-
ination and termination costs for the fixed-line network. Transport cost τ
is a per-minute cost between the two central office switches of the involved
networks. Note that the origination or termination cost includes the cost gen-
erated in each party’s central office switch. The transport cost is covered by
the calling network.9 I assume that the transport cost is the same between
the fixed-line network and either mobile network and is symmetric between a
fixed-to-mobile call and a mobile-to-fixed call.
Figure 1.2: Costs of Calls
-¾
Origination Transport Termination
Caller Switch 1 Switch 2 Receiver
I assume that there aren’t any universal fixed costs to reflect a joint and
common cost of serving the various customers for each network. But mobile
networks have a fixed cost cf per subscriber, which reflects the monthly cost
of connecting the customer to the network as well as billing and servicing the
customer. CF is a fixed cost per subscriber for the fixed-line network.
It is assumed that the access charge of mobile-to-fixed network A is
9In some sense, under the CPP regime, the origination cost includes the transport cost.
I separate them to compare this regime with the Bill and Keep regime, under which sharing
of transport cost becomes an issue.
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regulated at termination cost level CT , as in previous papers.10
A = CT (1.1)
Each mobile network freely charges access charge ai to the fixed-line network.
For each network, demand for outgoing calls depends only on the price
of an outgoing call and not on the price for incoming calls, which is paid by
the customers of the other network. Callers do not care about their calling
partners’ utilities. Given that each customer has the same marginal willingness
to pay for calling and the same utility of receiving calls, every mobile network
can offer uniform tariff for the overall use of its services. The fixed-fee F for
the fixed-line network is regulated at the fixed cost level, CF .
F = CF (1.2)
The fixed-line network is regulated to set its fixed-to-mobile retail prices pro-
portional to the access charge each mobile firm sets: ai and aj. Suppose the
fixed-line network offers its subscribers a per-minute usage charge Pi for mak-
ing calls to mobile network i, which is described by a function of total costs,
Pi ≡ g(CO + τ + ai), g′ > 0 (1.3)
This is obviously true in the case when fixed-to-mobile prices are regulated at
variable cost level, CO + τ + ai.
11 On the other hand, each mobile network
charges its subscribers a monthly fixed-fee fi and a per-minute charge pi for
making mobile-to-fixed calls. Suppose that once a subscriber has joined a
mobile network with usage charge pi, that subscriber makes q(pi) minutes of
10See Armstrong (2002a) and Wright (2000)
11See Wright (2002a).
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outbound calls to a fixed-line user. Each fixed-line network subscriber makes
Q(Pi) minute calls to a user of mobile network i.
A fixed set of homogeneous customers subscribe to the telecommunica-
tions services. For simplification, I assume that the fixed-line network has N
subscribers and mobile networks divide another N subscribers into two groups,
N1 and N2. This N can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality and then
N1 and N2 can be understood as market shares si and sj. Notice that full
market participation is assumed respectively in the fixed-line market and in
the mobile market and, as a result, si +sj = 1 always holds. In this framework
each market has no network externalities.12
Consumer preferences are known to firms. The utility of a consumer
with income y joining the fixed-line network is given by





U(Qi)− PiQi + Ũ(qi)
}
− F. (1.4)
V0 is a fixed utility enjoyed by a fixed-line user from subscribing to the fixed-
line network.13 U(Qi) is the utility derived from making Qi calls to a user in
the mobile network i, and Ũ(qi) is the utility derived from receiving qi calls
from a user in the mobile network i. All utility functions are assumed to be
concave.
The market share of each mobile network, si, is determined by network
competition for subscribers, which can be explained by the Hotelling product
differentiation model.14 Assume that mobile customers are endowed with a
12See Armstrong (2002a) for a model with partial market participation and network ex-
ternalities.
13V0 is assumed to be high enough that all consumers join this network.
14The Hotelling model captures the diversity of service characteristics provided by a
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value of x, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1].
Two mobile networks are located at each end point of this unit interval, re-
spectively. A mobile customer with value x has extra disutility from not being
able to consume his preferred services,
tx2 and t(1− x)2 (1.5)
for network 1 and 2 respectively, where t is the parameter that measures how
differentiated the networks are. The greater t is, the greater are the switching
costs, and the harder it is for one firm to steal away customers from the rival
firm by lowering its price. The utility derived by a consumer with income y
located at x from joining either mobile network i or j is respectively given by:
y + v0 − tx2 + u(qi)− piqi + ũ(Qi)− fi (1.6)
y + v0 − t(1− x)2 + u(qj)− pjqj + ũ(Qj)− fj (1.7)
v0 is a fixed utility, which a mobile network user has from subscribing to a
mobile network.15 u(qi) is utility from making calls to a fixed-line network
user and ũ(Qi) is utility from receiving calls from a fixed-line network user.
fi is a fixed-fee which the mobile user has to pay for every billing period.
Disregarding fixed utility, define net variable consumer surplus wi as:
wi ≡ u(qi)− piqi + ũ(Qi)− fi, i = 1, 2. (1.8)
A customer located at x is indifferent between the two mobile networks if
wi − tx2 = wj − t(1− x)2. (1.9)
telecommunication network –such as additional service options, customer services and mar-
keting.
15The constant vo ensures that all consumers will always choose to join one of the two
mobile networks if it is high enough.
9








I assume that each network subscriber benefits from receiving calls. For
the fixed-line network subscriber and mobile network subscriber, the utility
from receiving calls is assumed to be proportional to the calling-utility of the
caller in the corresponding network.16 This is only for technical simplicity.
Ũ(qi) ≡ B · u(qi), B > 0 (1.11)
ũ(Qi) ≡ β · U(Qi), β > 0 (1.12)
Defining the indirect utilities for fixed-to-mobile calls Qi and mobile-
to-fixed calls qi as:











, i = 1, 2, (1.14)
demand functions of Q(Pi) and q(pi) for the calls per subscriber can be derived.
Then,
V ′(Pi) = −Q(Pi) and v′(pi) = −q(pi) i = 1, 2. (1.15)







V (Pi) + Ũ(q(pi))
}
− F (1.16)
wi ≡ v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi))− fi, i = 1, 2. (1.17)
16The noise in the utility of receiving a call is introduced in Jeon et al. (2004): Ũ(qi)+ εqi
and ũ(Qi)+εQi. In this CPP regime, this noise does not affect an equilibrium since networks
do not set the receiver’s prices which would be affected by this disturbance term.
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{v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi))− v(pj)− ũ(Q(Pj))}+ (fj − fi)
2t
. (1.18)
Notice that the price of fixed–to-mobile call Pi can affect the mobile mar-
ket shares because mobile subscribers have utilities from receiving the calls
originated in the fixed-line network, ũ(Q(Pi)).
Access charges are chosen first, and then, taking these as given, firms
choose their retail tariffs non-cooperatively. Given the access charges (ai, aj, A),
each mobile firm chooses its tariff, (pi, fi) or (pj, fj).
17 On the other hand, re-
tail tariffs for the fixed-line network, (Pi, Pj, F ) are regulated according to
(1.2) and (1.3), given (ai, aj, A).
Since the total number of customers N can be normalized to one, all
demands and profits can be understood as a per-customer unit: Q(Pi), q(pi),
Π, πi.
1.3 The Benchmark: Efficient Allocation
I derive the social optimum for future reference. Consider an idealized
situation in which a social planner chooses the market shares and the volume
of calls. In this symmetric setup, equal market division minimizes the average
consumer’s disutility from not being able to consume his preferred service.
Let’s define T (si) as the average consumer’s disutility from not being
able to consume her preferred service.18 Using disutilities (1.5), for arbitrary
17See Armstrong (1998, p. 552) for this move order.
18See Laffont et al. (1998a)
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si, this measure of the distance between preferred and actual brand choice is
given by:

















T (si) is minimized at si =
1
2












[−3 + 6si] = 0 (1.20)




U(Q) + Ũ(q) + u(q) + ũ(Q)− (CO + τ + ct)Q− (co + τ + CT )q (1.21)
The optimal volumes Q̂ and q̂ are determined by:
U ′(Q̂) + ũ′(Q̂) = CO + τ + ct (1.22)
u′(q̂) + Ũ ′(q̂) = co + τ + CT (1.23)
Since ũ′(·) = βU ′(·) and Ũ ′(·) = Bu′(·),
U ′(Q̂) =




co + τ + CT
1 + B
. (1.25)
To implement the optimal outcome, the social planner can use symmet-
ric tariffs so as to achieve equal market division (si =
1
2
). Since the volume is
12
determined by the caller, the optimal volume is obtained by choosing:
P̂ = U ′(Q̂) = CO + τ + ct − ũ′(Q̂) (1.26)
p̂ = u′(q̂) = co + τ + CT − Ũ ′(q̂) (1.27)
Under the CPP regime, callers should pay for the origination cost, transport
cost and access charges.
P̂ = CO + τ + â (1.28)
p̂ = co + τ + Â (1.29)
For optimality, access charges should be given by:
â = ct − ũ′(Q̂) (1.30)
Â = CT − Ũ ′(q̂) (1.31)
To satisfy the each industry’s break-even constraint, F and f should be ad-
justed.
Π = (Â− CT )q̂ + (P̂ − CO − τ − â)Q̂ + F̂ − CF = 0 (1.32)
π = (â− ct)Q̂ + (p̂− co − τ − Â)q + f̂ − cf = 0 (1.33)
F̂ = CF + Ũ ′(q̂)q̂ (1.34)
f̂ = cf + ũ′(Q̂)Q̂ (1.35)
1.4 Market Equilibrium
1.4.1 Equilibrium Retail Tariffs
Let’s start with the second stage, in which given (ai, aj, A) mobile firms
choose their own retail tariffs simultaneously. In the second-stage game, mobile
13












pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ fi − cf
}
(1.36)
Using equation (1.17), wi ≡ v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi)) − fi, the optimization problem
of each mobile network can be solved with respect to pi and wi, instead of pi


















pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi))− wi − cf
}
(1.37)
The first order conditions (FOCs) of each mobile network are the following.







































pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ (v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi))− wi)− cf
}









pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ fi − cf
}
= 0 (1.39)
Lemma 1. ∀ i, si 6= 0: In the mobile market, a cornered-market equilibrium
does not exist.
19See Laffont et al. (1998a, p. 20).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Since cornered-market equilibrium does not exist, from the FOC (1.38),
the usage price is set at marginal cost according to the two-part tariff problem:
p∗i = c
o + τ + CT , i = 1, 2. (1.40)
Combining the above result (1.40) with the FOC (1.39), the equilibrium fixed-
fee is:
f ∗i = c




, i = 1, 2. (1.41)
Furthermore, this is a unique equilibrium for any given (ai, aj) and (A,Pi, Pj, F ).
Lemma 2. ∃ a unique equilibrium (p∗i , p∗j , w∗i , w∗j ), such that p∗i = p∗j = co+τ +
CT , given (ai, aj; A,Pi, Pj, F ): A unique mobile market equilibrium in terms
of retail prices and consumer surplus exists, given access charges and fixed-to-
mobile retail tariffs. Furthermore, their retail usage prices are symmetric.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The results about mobile firms in equations (1.40) and (1.41) are the
same as the results of Wright (2000). Equation (1.41) says that for a given
market share, as far as access profit increases, increased access revenue results
in an equal reduction of fixed-fees. Starting from cost-based access charges,
higher access charges yield a bigger “reward” for attracting other subscribers.
This “reward” is the access profit that the additional subscriber creates, which
creates more aggressive competition for subscribers by mobile firms. If the
access charges of both firms are increased simultaneously, equilibrium fixed-
fees decrease until access profit is maximized.20
20See Wright (2000, Proposition 1).
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The retail prices of the fixed-line network are regulated by equation







i − CO − τ − ai)Q(P ∗i ) (1.42)
where P ∗i = g(C
O + τ + ai), g
′ > 0.
Because the fixed-line network is regulated, they cannot affect the mobile
market shares, even though the receiving-utility of mobile users depends on
the fixed-to-mobile retail prices.
1.4.2 Equilibrium Access Charges
Now at the first stage, given conditions (1.3), (1.40) and (1.41), each
mobile firm chooses its own access charge. The fixed-line network is regulated
to set its access charge at the termination cost level CT .
Mobile network i chooses its access charge ai, given aj. Considering the
tariffs of the mobile firms determined at the second stage, (1.40) and (1.41),











p∗i − co − τ − CT
)
+ f ∗i − cf
}
=2t · s2i . (1.43)
The equilibrium profits of the mobile firms depend only on its market share,
but access charges affect this market share. Using the definition of net con-




i ) + ũ(Q(P
∗
i ))− cf − 2t · si + Q(P ∗i )(ai − ct), i = 1, 2. (1.44)
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Since p∗i = c
o +τ +CT , v(p∗i ) = v(p
∗
j). Then, the market share is: for i, j = 1, 2





ũ(Q(P ∗i )) + (ai − ct)Q(P ∗i )− ũ(Q(P ∗j ))− (aj − ct)Q(P ∗j )
6t
.
Since P ∗i = g(C






ũ(Q(g(CO + τ + ai))) + (ai − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + ai))
6t
− ũ(Q(g(C
O + τ + aj))) + (aj − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + aj))
6t
. (1.45)
Using equation (1.43) and (1.45), the optimization problem of each mobile
firm at the first stage is:
max
ai






ũ(Q(g(CO + τ + ai))) + (ai − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + ai))
6t
− ũ(Q(g(C










































= 0, i = 1, 2
(1.47)
where Pi = g(C
O + τ + ai). Since si 6= 0, the access charge should satisfy this
condition.
Qi(g(C
O + τ + ai)) +
(








Furthermore, this is a unique and symmetric equilibrium access charge, a∗i =
a∗j = a
∗.
Lemma 3. Assume Q(·) and g(·) are (almost) linear and β ≤ 1. ∃ a unique
and symmetric equilibrium in (a∗i = a
∗
j = a
∗): This equilibrium, in terms of
mobile access charges, is unique and symmetric and is characterized by this
equation,
Qi(g(C
O + τ + a∗)) +
(




O + τ + a∗))
∂a
= 0. (1.49)
Proof. a∗i from equation (1.48) is a dominant strategy for each mobile firm
because behavior in the second stage is fixed, as in equations (1.40) and (1.41).
So (a∗i , a
∗
j) is a unique market equilibrium and is symmetric because of the
symmetrical demand and cost structures. See Appendix A for details.
From equation (1.49), one can see the negative relation between the
equilibrium access charge and β.
Lemma 4. Assume Q(·) is (almost) linear. Equilibrium mobile access charge












< 0 holds, as far as the demand for fixed-to-mobile calls
Q(P ) is close to linear. Let’s say above equation (1.48) is an implicit function
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O + τ + a∗))
∂a2
' 0
Lemma 5. Assume Q(·) and g(·) are (almost) linear. If mobile users do not
have receiving-utility so that β = 0, each mobile network sets its access charge
at the traditional monopoly level, am, which is characterized by:
Qi(g(C
O + τ + am)) +
(
am − ct) ∂Qi(g(C
O + τ + am))
∂a
= 0. (1.50)
If mobile users have positive receiving-utility so that (β > 0), each mobile
network sets its access charge below the traditional monopoly level, (a∗ < am).
Proof. See Wright (2002a). This is clear from Lemma 4. See Appendix A for
details.
As in Wright (2002a), Lemma 5 says that when mobile networks con-
sider the receiving-utility of their subscribers, the mobile access charges are
below the traditional monopoly level, am, which would be determined without
considering the receiving-utility. When the receiving-utility of mobile users is
zero, so that β = 0, the mobile networks set the access charge to the traditional
19



















monopoly level, am. As β increases from zero, the mobile networks lower ac-
cess charges. See Figure 1.3. How does β make access charge lower? If access
charge ai is increased, the fixed-to-mobile retail price Pi is increased according
to the rule g(CO +τ +ai). This increased fixed-line retail price reduces the vol-
ume of fixed-to-mobile calls Q(Pi). This reduction in call volume leads to the
decrease in call-receiving utility of the mobile network subscribers, ũ(Qi). This
creates a decrease in the welfare of the subscribers, wi. Eventually, the mobile
networks will have some market share loss and profit loss. Networks cannot
simply set the traditional monopoly level access charge because of its negative
20
effect on incoming call volume and on the utility of its own subscribers. This
effect keeps the access charge below the traditional monopoly level.21
From equation (1.49), ct− ∂ũ(Qi)
∂Qi
can be thought as “perceived marginal
costs,” which incorporates call externalities. This means that mobile networks
accept termination costs discounted by the negative effect of an access charge
on its own subscribers’ receiving-utility. Note that even though the access
charges are lower than the traditional monopoly level, mobile networks still
set inefficiently high access charges, creating a new monopoly level that in-
corporates the receiver’s utility. Under the CPP regime, these abnormally
high fixed-to-mobile access charges exist and regulatory efforts are necessary
to control them.
Proposition 1. Suppose the regulator sets retail prices for the fixed-line net-
work at the cost level (P = CO+τ+a) and mobile users have positive receiving-
utility (β > 0). Each mobile network will set its access charge above the ter-
mination cost (a∗ > ct) if β < 1. When β = 1, they set access charges at the
cost level, a∗ = ct.
Proof. Suppose each mobile network sets its access charge at the termination
cost level (a = ct). From equation (1.48), when a = ct,
Qi(g(C













. Then one can say that for mobile firm to set a = ct,








21See Wright (2002a, pp. 306-307).
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= −Qi by the
property of indirect utility from quasi-linear utility. Then if g(CO + τ + a) =






From Lemma 4, a is decreasing function of β. When β < 1, a > ct.
According to Proposition 1, when the receiver’s utility is smaller than
the caller’s utility, β < 1, mobile networks can still set above the “techni-
cal cost” (ct) and have a positive markup on the access market. When the
receiving-utility of mobile users is the same as the calling-utility of the caller
in the fixed-line network, mobile networks have to set access charges at the
technical cost level, a = ct.22 See Figure 1.3.
1.4.3 Symmetric and Unique Market Equilibrium
Since access charges are determined symmetrically in equilibrium, all
other equilibrium prices become symmetric. First, equilibrium fixed-to-mobile
retail prices are symmetric.
P ∗i = P
∗
j = g(C
O + τ + a∗) = P ∗ (1.51)
The fixed-fee of the fixed-line network is set at the cost level, F ∗ = CT . From








22If β is big enough such as (β > 1), the mobile networks may set below-cost access
charges to maximize their market share. But these high β cases are considered unusual.
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Equilibrium prices for mobile-to-fixed calls are set at cost level and are sym-




O + τ + CT = p∗ (1.53)
Let’s look at the equilibrium fixed-fees of mobile firms, which are derived from
equations (1.41) and (1.52).
f ∗i = f
∗
j = c
f + t− (a∗ − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) = f ∗ (1.54)
Even though mobile firms have an incentive to attract subscribers by lowering
fixed-fees, which are subsidized by positive access profit, an escalation of access
charges does not occur.23 Mobile firms set their access charges below the
traditional monopoly level.
Proposition 2. (the existence of a unique and symmetric equilib-
rium) Assume Q(·) and g(·) are (almost) linear and β ≤ 1. There exists a
unique and symmetric equilibrium (p∗i = p
∗
j = p
∗, f ∗i = f
∗
j = f




which is characterized by these conditions,
i) p∗ = co + τ + CT .
ii) f ∗ = cf + t− (a∗ − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)).
iii) Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) +
(






Proof. By Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium
which satisfies conditions i), ii) and iii).
Because equilibrium mobile retail prices are symmetric, mobile-to-fixed




∗) = q(co + τ + CT ) = q∗
23See Wright (2002a) for the case of escalated access charges.
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From equation (1.43) and symmetric market shares, the equilibrium profits of











o + τ + CT ) + ũ(Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)))− cf − t
+ (a∗ − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) (1.56)
=w∗
On the other hand, the monopoly fixed-line network is regulated. Since
their fixed-fee and access charge are set at the cost level, their equilibrium
profit is:
Π∗ = (P ∗ − CO − τ − a∗)Q(P ∗) (1.57)
since P ∗i = P
∗
j = P
∗. Since the usage price of fixed-to-mobile calls decreases
due to low mobile access charges, the level of fixed-to-mobile call volume is




O + τ + a∗)) = Q∗ (1.58)
A fixed-line network user has the following consumer surplus:
W ∗ = V (g(CO + τ + a∗)) + Ũ
(
q(co + τ + CT )
)− CF (1.59)
which should be greater than the case that does not account for the receiving-
utility of mobile users because the calling volume is greater.
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1.5 Welfare Distribution
Before looking at the welfare transfer, it has to be noticed that as β
and B increase, the total utility of each network user increases. As a result,
the utility of each consumer can increase in spite of the welfare transfer. In
this subsection, I focus on only the change in β, the receiving-utility of mobile
users disregarding B, receiving-utility of fixed-line users.
Table 1.1 compares retail tariffs for fixed-line users and mobile users.
If β = 0, mobile networks set the monopoly access charges, am. In this case
of no receiver’s utility, fixed-line users have to pay high retail prices because
of high mobile access charges, P ∗ = g(CO + τ + am), and the positive access
profit is used to subsidize the mobile users, to whom a low fixed-fee, f ∗ =
cf + t − Q(P ∗)(am − ct) is offered. This means that the high access charges
increase surplus transfer from fixed-line users to mobile users.
Table 1.1: Welfare Transfer between Fixed-line and Mobile Users
β = 0 (a∗ = am) β = 1(a∗ = ct)
Fixed-line P ∗ = g(CO + τ + am) P ∗ = g(CO + τ + ct)
Users F ∗ = CF F ∗ = CF
Mobile p∗ = co + τ + CT p∗ = co + τ + CT
Users f ∗ = cf + t−Q(P ∗)(am − ct) f ∗ = cf + t
Now, as β increases, this situation changes. Mobile access charges de-
crease and fixed-line users do not need to pay high mobile access charges.
Instead, mobile users are offered a higher fixed-fee. When the receiving-utility
is not considered, welfare is transferred from fixed-line users to mobile users.
On the other hand, once the receiving-utility is considered, the surplus trans-
fer is reversed from mobile users to fixed-line users. This reversed transfer
increases as the receiving-utility becomes larger. Finally, if β = 1, access
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charges are set at the cost level, a∗ = ct, and mobile access profits disappear,
Q(P ∗)(a∗ − ct) = 0. Fixed-line users pay calling-prices at the technical cost
level, P ∗ = g(CO + τ + ct) and mobile users have to pay a cost level fixed-fee,
f ∗ = cf + t without getting any subsidy from access profits.
Proposition 3. Under the CPP regime, when the receiving-utility of mobile
users increases (i.e. when β increases), welfare transfer from mobile users to
fixed-line users is increased. This is a reversal of the welfare transfer which
increases when the receiving-utility of mobile users is not considered.
Proof. Immediately derived from Lemmas 4 and 5.
1.6 The Inefficiency of Market Equilibrium
Suppose the regulator sets fixed-to-mobile prices for the fixed-line net-
work at cost level:
g(CO + τ + a) = CO + τ + a. (1.60)
Table 1.2 compares the market equilibrium and efficient allocation when β and
B are 0 or 1. First, let’s examine the case when β = B = 0, which means there
is no receiver’s utility. In this case, at equilibrium, fixed-to-mobile call volume,
Q, is inefficient, but mobile-to-fixed call volume, q, is optimally determined.
However, if the regulator does not know the costs of the fixed-line network,
efficient mobile-to-fixed call volume cannot be achieved either.
On the other hand, when receiver’s utility is equal to caller’s utility,
β = B = 1, both volume, Q and q are not efficient. For any value of receiver’s
utility, CPP cannot achieve efficient allocation in this market.
Without receiver’s utility there do not exist any call externalities. The
distortion comes only from the monopoly mobile access market. However,
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Table 1.2: Access Market Failure
β = B = 0 β = B = 1
Market P ∗ = U ′(Q(P ∗)) = CO + τ + am P ∗ = U ′(Q(P ∗)) = CO + τ + ct
Equilibrium p∗ = u′(q(p∗)) = co + τ + CT p∗ = u′(q(p∗)) = co + τ + CT
Efficient U ′(Q̂) = C
O+τ+ct
1+β = C





Allocation u′(q̂) = c
o+τ+CT
1+B = c





as receiver’s utility increases, call externalities in fixed-to-mobile calls increase
but they are internalized by the mobile networks, which consider the receiving-
utility of their own subscribers. So, the distortion in the mobile access market
continues to come from the monopoly in the market. See Figure 1.3. When
β = 1, the mobile access charge is determined at a∗ = ct, which is much higher
than the efficient level â = ct − ∂U(Q)
∂Q
.
On the other hand, one more distortion exists in the fixed-line access
market. I assume that the fixed-line network is regulated and its access charge
is also regulated at the termination cost level, CT . But to implement the
efficient volume of mobile-to-fixed call, q, it is necessary that
Â = CT −Bu′(q̂).
The larger the receiver’s utility, the larger the regulatory distortion in mobile-
to-fixed call volume. In the case that the receiver’s utility is not known to the
regulator, it’s nearly impossible to correct this regulatory inefficiency.
Because the CPP regime creates inefficiencies in both directions of the
access markets, new payment structures for the telecommunications market
have been considered to remove these access market distortions and incor-
porate the call externalities.24 These proposals recommend removing access
24See DeGraba (2000) and Atkinson and Barnekov (2000).
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markets and instead, introducing prices for incoming calls.
1.7 Conclusion
Previous literature has shown that high mobile access charges increase
the welfare transfer from fixed-line users to mobile users when not considering
the receiver’s utility. This research focuses on the abnormal mobile-access
charge, which the mobile networks receive from the fixed-line network. Mobile
networks attract their subscribers by subsidizing costs using the access profits.
If, under the CPP regime, the receiver’s utility is taken into account, it
decreases the incentive for mobile networks to charge monopoly access charges.
When mobile networks take into account the receiving-utility of their own
subscribers, they can no longer set monopoly level access charges because
the mobile networks must take into account the negative effect of high access
charge on their subscribers’ receiving-utility. This receiving-utility affects their
market share.
In this study, I introduce the receiver’s utility into one of the traditional
network interconnection models, which has a monopoly fixed-line network and
two competitive mobile networks. My focus is on the welfare distribution
between fixed-line and mobile users.
I found that, as the receiver’s utility increases, the welfare transfer
from fixed-line to mobile users is reversed, and finally when the receiver’s
utility is the same as the caller’s utility, the surplus of fixed-line users is no
longer exploited by the mobile networks. Instead, the mobile networks must
take surplus of mobile users through higher fixed-fee to recover their reduced
profit. This market result seems to be efficient for fixed-line users but it’s not
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socially optimal because mobile access charges are still higher than the per-
ceived marginal cost, which incorporates the receiving-utility of mobile users.
On the other hand, insofar as the regulator does not know the receiving-utility
of fixed-line users, the regulatory inefficiency of the fixed-line access market is
unavoidable.
Whether the receiver’s utility is high or low, access markets under the
CPP regime continue to be inefficient. Because of this, some experts have
proposed new payment structures for telecommunications market to incorpo-
rate the call externalities and remove access market distortions. I expect that
future research will explore the pros and cons of these new payment regimes.
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Chapter 2
The Bill-and-Keep Regime in the Fixed-line
and Mobile Network Interconnection
2.1 Introduction
In many countries in Asia and Europe, the payment structure of the
telecommunications market is based on the Calling Party Pays Principle (CPP),
which means that only callers pay for the calls. This principle assumes that
a call gives utility to the calling party but not to the called party so that
receivers do not pay at all. Since receivers actually enjoy the call, the CPP
regime leads to call externalities, which create inefficiencies in the volume of
calls and the usage of telecommunications facilities.
When calls are made between two subscribers of different telecommuni-
cations networks, the calling network pays an “access charge” to the receiving
network. This “access market” is in effect a monopoly, because the caller wants
to make a call to a recipient in a different network, but the receiving network
is the only one that can deliver the call to the designated receiver.1 Because
of this monopoly property, many countries regulate the access markets be-
tween telecommunications networks. However, the European fixed-to-mobile
access market is exceptional. In Europe, mobile telecommunications markets
1The activity of a receiving network delivering a call to its subscriber is called “call
termination.” Therefore, access charges are compensation for the call termination.
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have been considered to be competitive and mobile telecommunications com-
panies have been treated differently than fixed-line networks, such as local call
companies. In Europe, fixed-to-mobile access charges were not regulated even
though mobile-to-fixed access charges were controlled.2
Wright (2002a) and Armstrong (2002a) examine the European access
market between fixed-line and mobile networks under the CPP regime. They
find that even if competition for subscribers in the mobile market is intense
and mobile networks do not have super-normal profits, the monopoly profits
from call termination and the consequent deadweight loss persist and are used
to finance subsidized retail tariffs to attract subscribers.
Under the CPP regime, it’s hard to correct this access market distor-
tion. Wright (2002a) shows that if the networks consider the receiving-utility
of their own subscribers, the access charges decrease from the monopoly level.
However, in the previous chapter I show that this access market distortion
does not disappear regardless of the size of the receiving-utility under the
CPP. When the receiving-utility is small, the fixed-to-mobile access charges
are close to monopoly level. On the other hand, when the receiving-utility is
large, call externalities are very large and the access charge problem is reduced.
Recently several researchers have studied other payment structures.
Jeon et al. (2004) introduce the Receiver Pays Principle (RPP) into the typ-
ical network competition model of Laffont et al. (1998a,b). This RPP regime
introduces receiver’s prices to incorporate the call externalities. However, the
regime still retains positive access charges. Assuming that access charges are
set by regulation or some arrangement between the networks, Jeon, Laffont
2Recently, this status has changed because the British telecommunications regulator,
Oftel, decided to regulate the fixed-to-mobile access charges in U.K. See Oftel (2003).
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and Tirole (2004) show that there exists an equilibrium regardless of whether
the receiver’s prices are regulated or determined by the market. This paper
does not study the fixed-to-mobile access market directly but instead studies
the interconnection between two symmetric networks.
DeGraba (2000), in the so-called ‘COBAK paper’, suggests a new
regime to replace the CPP. According to his paper, the Central Office Bill
and Keep (COBAK) regime is a unified approach to interconnection pricing.
It can be applied to all types of carriers interconnecting with the local circuit-
switched network and to all types of traffic passing over to the network. The
COBAK proposal consists of two rules: first, the called party’s carrier cannot
charge the interconnecting carrier to terminate the call. Thus each carrier re-
covers the cost of the loop and local switch from its own end-users. Second, the
calling party’s network is responsible for a transport cost – the cost of trans-
porting a call between the calling party’s and the called party’s central offices.
DeGraba insists that the COBAK regime solves or reduces many of the sig-
nificant problems that plague the existing interconnection regimes, including
terminating access monopoly, inefficient end-user prices, and the regulatory
arbitrage opportunity.3
The COBAK proposal is modified in DeGraba (2003), in which, he sug-
gests a ‘Meet-Point Bill and Keep (MBAK).’ Unlike the COBAK, the MBAK
focuses on symmetric cases and recommends that both networks share trans-
port costs equally. DeGraba (2003) shows that if the caller and the receiver
share the value of a minute of call, they can consume the optimal volume when
3A typical example of a regulatory arbitrage opportunity is the “ISP(Internet Service
Provider) reciprocal compensation” problem. ISPs generally have incoming calls. If a
network has an ISP as its customer, the network can get a substantial amount of access
revenue under the reciprocal compensation scheme for access charges.
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they jointly pay a per minute price equal to the marginal cost of that minute,
and each customer pays a proportion of this price equal to the proportion of
the value he receives from that minute.4 A symmetric case is an obvious ex-
ample. If both parties to a call share the value of a call equally and competing
networks have access to the same technology, MBAK maximizes social surplus
by charging the cost proportional to the benefit of each party.5
Under both of these Bill-and-Keep regimes, the involved networks nego-
tiate and arrange a meet-point between two central offices and they exchange
traffic at this point on a Bill-and-Keep basis. If both networks cannot agree
on a meet-point negotiation, as a default rule one of the two Bill-and-Keep
regimes is applied. Under COBAK, the meet-point should be “the central of-
fice of the receiving network,” but under MBAK, it should be the “midpoint”
of the trunk line between the two central offices.
Because the Bill-and-Keep system requires the involved networks to
recover the cost of a call from their own subscriber, it removes the call exter-
nalities and problematic access charges by making subscribers pay for receiv-
ing as well as making calls. However, neither of these two papers addresses
the network competition issue. DeGraba (2000) only gives a description of
the COBAK regime and does not provide any specific model. To show the
efficiency of the Bill-and-Keep regime, DeGraba (2003) uses a simple inter-
connection model between two symmetric networks in which carriers set their
prices at cost level and the receiver and the caller share the given value of a
4This first best outcome occurs when the proportion of call values between both parties
to a call is equal to the proportion of marginal costs between both networks. See equation
(2.73) at page 53.
5When both networks have the same technology, if both networks share the transport
cost evenly and each network pays the cost within its own network, the first best outcome
occurs.
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call. But his paper does not use a typical network competition model such as
the one used by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b).
In this study, I examine a new setup which combines the Bill-and-Keep
idea with a traditional network competition model. I create a traditional
interconnection model between two competitive mobile networks and a regu-
lated monopoly fixed-line network. I introduce to the model the Bill-and-Keep
regime instead of the CPP regime as a possible way of resolving the above-cost
access charges and call externalities. There is no access market, so networks
do not need to pay access charges. All mobile firms can set the retail tariffs
freely but prices under the fixed-line network are regulated. The Bill-and-Keep
requires both the receiving network and the calling network to share call cost,
including all transport costs. Because each carrier has to recover the cost of
its loop and local switch and part of the transport cost from its own end-users,
I allow networks to charge prices for incoming as well as outgoing calls. These
prices are the “receiver’s price” and the “caller’s price.” As a result, both
parties to a call can decide the call volume.
I show that given a meet-point, a market equilibrium exists. Further-
more, I explain that to implement a socially optimal equilibrium, proper meet-
points corresponding to the receiver’s utility are necessary. In terms of surplus,
consumers are the only beneficiaries of the Bill-and-Keep, and the telecommu-
nications networks are not better off in this model.
2.2 The Model
Assume that the telecommunications market has only two kinds of net-
works: fixed-line and mobile. The fixed-line network is a monopoly and the
mobile market has two symmetric and competitive firms. On-net calls for
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each network and mobile-to-mobile calls are ignored to allow a focus on the
interaction between the fixed-line network and the mobile networks.
The payment system of the telecommunications market is the Bill-and-
Keep system. Assuming that both caller and receiver benefit from the calls,
they both have to bear the costs raised in the network to which they sub-
scribe. As a result, it’s reasonable to assume that either the receiver or the
caller can hang up first. Since both the caller and the receiver pay for a call,
the call externalities do not arise. This pricing system weakens the appropri-
ateness of access charges. If the receiving network recovers their cost from
their own subscribers, it’s hard to accept the access charge paid by the calling
network because that is usually compensation for using the receiving network.
Therefore, I assume that networks do not pay any access charges.
Figure 2.1: Bill-and-Keep Regime
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↓ L99 Termination Cost
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receiver
Let’s examine the cost structure of this model. I assume that there
aren’t any fixed costs to reflect a joint and common cost of serving the various
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customers for each network. But mobile networks have a fixed cost cf per
subscriber, which reflects the monthly cost of connecting the customer to the
network as well as billing and servicing the customer. CF is a fixed cost per
subscriber for the fixed-line network. The costs to complete calls are assumed
to be composed of three parts: origination, termination and transport. Orig-
ination cost co is a per-minute cost generated in the mobile network when a
subscriber makes a call. The termination cost ct is a per-minute cost gener-
ated in the mobile network when one of its subscribers receives a call. The
two mobile networks have symmetric cost structures. The fixed-line network
has a different cost structure than the mobile networks. CO and CT are, re-
spectively, the origination and termination costs for the fixed-line network.
Transport cost τ is a per-minute cost between the two central office switches
of the involved networks. Figure 2.2 shows the costs of a fixed-to-mobile call.
Figure 2.2: Costs of a Fixed-to-Mobile Call
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Under the Bill-and-Keep regime, networks exchange traffic on a ‘Bill-
and-Keep’ basis at an arranged meet-point of the trunk line connecting the
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networks, which means that each network pays part of the cost of operating a
single trunk line between the networks. As a result, setting a meet-point can
be understood as a cost-allocation between the related networks to maintain
a trunk line. I assume that the meet-point between the two central offices is
arranged by a regulator or by both networks before the networks choose retail
prices, and this does not need to follow the COBAK or MBAK system. I
assume the total transport cost is τ between the fixed-line network and either
mobile network. It is symmetric for both directions of a call. Mobile network i
pays θiτ of the transport cost when their subscribers make a call to the fixed-
line network, and the fixed-line network pays Θiτ when their subscribers make
a call to mobile network i. The receiving network pays the remaining portion
of τ . When meet-points are arranged between two central offices in the real
world, Θi and θi ∈ [0, 1]. However, notice that theoretically Θi and θi can be
negative or greater than 1, especially for optimality.
Given that each customer has the same marginal willingness to pay for
making or receiving calls, all mobile networks can offer a uniform tariff for
the overall use of its services. The fixed-fee F for the fixed-line network is
regulated at the fixed cost level, CF .
F ≡ CF (2.1)
The fixed-line network is regulated such that its retail prices are proportional
to the costs, including the allocated transport costs. Suppose the fixed-line
network offers its subscribers a per-minute usage charge Pi for making calls to
mobile network i and Ri for receiving calls from mobile network i. These are
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described by functions of the total costs, given meet-points (Θi, θi).
Pi ≡ g(CO + Θiτ) (2.2)
Ri ≡ g(CT + (1− θi)τ), g′ > 0 (2.3)
This is obviously true in the case when two retail prices are regulated at
the variable cost level. On the other hand, each mobile network charges its
subscribers a monthly fixed-fee fi and a per-minute charge pi for making calls
to the fixed-line network and ri for receiving calls from the fixed-line network.
Mobile networks choose their own tariffs non-cooperatively. Suppose that
once a subscriber has joined a mobile network with usage charge (pi, ri), that
subscriber wants to make q(pi) minutes of outbound calls to a fixed-line user
and receive Q(ri) minutes of inbound calls from a fixed-line user for a billing
period. Each fixed-line network subscriber wants to make Q(Pi) minutes of
outbound calls to a subscriber in mobile network i and wants to receive q(Ri)
minutes of inbound calls from a subscriber in mobile network i.
A fixed set of homogeneous customers subscribe to the telecommunica-
tions services. For simplification, I assume that the fixed-line network has N
subscribers and mobile networks divide another N subscribers into two groups,
N1 and N2. This N can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality and then
N1 and N2 can be understood as market shares si and sj. Notice that full
market participation is assumed respectively in the fixed-line market and in
the mobile market and, as a result, si +sj = 1 always holds. In this framework
each market has no network externalities.
Consumer preferences are known to firms. Mobile service and fixed-
line service each provide different utilities. For example, mobile phone service
gives subscribers mobility in addition to the usual utility of calls. I assume that
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the utility function of fixed-line network subscribers is different from that of
mobile network subscribers. Subscribers of each network benefit from outgoing
and incoming calls separably. For fixed-line network subscribers and mobile
network subscribers, their concave utilities from making calls are:
U(Qi) and u(qi), i = 1, 2
where Qi is the length of fixed-to-mobile calls and qi is the length of mobile-
to-fixed calls between each pair of caller and receiver. Since the receivers have
to pay for incoming calls, it is reasonable to assume that the receivers can
hang up whenever they want. Both the caller and the receiver have positive
probability of hanging up first – so called “caller’s sovereignty” and “receiver’s
sovereignty.” As a result, the volume of calls is non-cooperatively decided by
callers and receivers. To describe this situation, assume that the marginal
utility of receiving a call is subject to noise, expressed by a random variable
ε.6 For i = 1, 2,
Ũ(qi) + εqi (2.4)
ũ(Qi) + εQi (2.5)
where ε follows the distribution function Ψ(·) with wide enough support [ε, ε̄],
zero mean and density ψ(·), which is strictly positive for all ε in [ε, ε̄]. Further-
more, I assume that the noise ε is identically and independently distributed for
each caller-receiver pair. For technical simplicity only, assume that for i = 1, 2,
Ũ(qi) = B · u(qi) , B > 0 (2.6)
ũ(Qi) = β · U(Qi) , β > 0. (2.7)
6See Jeon et al. (2004).
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B is an expected ratio of the receiver’s utility to caller’s utility for a mobile-
to-fixed call. Analogously, β is this ratio for a fixed-to-mobile call. Given
(Pi, Ri, pi, ri) and a realized value of ε, unless the receiver hangs up the call
first, the caller will continue the call until her marginal utility is equal to the
calling price. For i = 1, 2,
U ′(Qi) = Pi (2.8)
u′ (qi) = pi. (2.9)
Similarly, unless the caller hangs up the call first, the receiver with noise ε will
continue the call until her marginal utility is equal to the receiving-price. For
i = 1, 2,
Ũ ′(qi) + ε = Ri (2.10)
ũ′(Qi) + ε = ri. (2.11)
Suppose a subscriber of the fixed-line network calls a subscriber of
mobile network i. Given the caller’s price Pi, the receiver’s price ri and a
realized value of ε, if the caller does not hang up the call first, Pi is not greater
than her marginal utility U ′. In this case, the receiver with noise ε will continue
the call until her marginal utility is equal to ri. Namely, the receiver consumes
the volume of calls which satisfies above equation (2.11). Let’s say this volume
quantity QRi . With the volume of calls Q
R
i , the caller has marginal utility of








Since the Pi is less than or equal to
ri−ε
β
(low ε), the receiver determines
the volume of calls, and the consumed volume is QRi = Qi(
ri−ε
β
), which is the
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receiver’s demand function. On the other hand, if the caller’s price Pi is greater
than this marginal utility level U ′(QRi ) =
ri−ε
β
(high ε), the caller determines
the volume of calls by (2.8) and the consumed volume of calls is QCi = Qi(Pi),
which is the caller’s demand function.
ri − ε
β
≤ U ′(QCi ) = Pi (2.13)
Therefore, the volume of calls from the fixed-line network to mobile network i
is determined by the following equation. For i = 1, 2,

















D(Pi, ri) = Qi(max{Pi, ri − ε
β
}). (2.15)
A larger ε increases the possibility of the caller’s sovereignty with realized
volume Qi (Pi), and a smaller ε increases the possibility of the receiver’s
sovereignty with realized volume Qi(
ri−ε
β
). Similarly, the volume of opposite-
direction calls – calls from mobile network i to the fixed-line network – is for
i = 1, 2,
d(pi, Ri) = qi(max{pi, Ri − ε
B
}). (2.16)
The above two volumes can be expressed as demand functions:

















In equation (2.17), the first term on the right hand side represents the expected
demand for fixed-to-mobile calls for large values of ε, such that the caller on
the fixed-line network is the one that terminates the call. The second term is
the expected fixed-to-mobile demand for small values of ε, where the receiver
on mobile network i hangs up first. The first term on the right hand side
of equation (2.18) represents the expected demand for mobile-to-fixed calls
for high values of ε, where the caller on mobile network i terminates. The
second term is expected demand over the range of ε where the receiver on the
fixed-line network terminates the call.
Similarly the utilities of the fixed-line network subscriber making calls
to mobile network i and mobile network i’s subscriber making calls to the
fixed-line network are, respectively, given by:











ψ(ε)dε, i = 1, 2 (2.19)











ψ(ε)dε, i = 1, 2. (2.20)
I now define the receiver’s utility before payment. The utilities of the fixed-line
network subscriber receiving calls from mobile network i and mobile network
i’s subscriber receiving calls from the fixed-line network are given, respectively,


















































Assume that all utilities are separably additive. Ignoring fixed utilities,













Ω̃(pi, Ri)−Ri · d(pi, Ri)
}
− F (2.23)
The mobile market share, si, is determined by network competition for
subscribers, which can be explained by the Hotelling product differentiation
model. Assume that mobile network users are endowed with a value of x,
which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Two mobile
networks are located at each end point of this unit interval, respectively. A
mobile user with value x has extra disutility from not being able to consume
his preferred services:
tx2 and t(1− x)2 (2.24)
for network 1 and 2 respectively. t is the parameter that measures how differ-
entiated the networks are. The greater t is, the greater are the switching costs,
and the harder it is for one network to steal away customers from the rival
network by lowering its price. The utility derived by a consumer with income
y located at x from joining either mobile network i or j is, respectively, given
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by:
y + v0 − tx2 + ω(pi, Ri)− pid(pi, Ri) + ω̃(Pi, ri)− riDi(Pi, ri)− fi (2.25)
y + v0 − t(1− x)2 + ω(pj, Rj)− pjd(pj, Rj) + ω̃(Pj, rj)− rjD(Pj, rj)− fj
(2.26)
v0 is the fixed utility of a mobile network user from subscribing to a mobile
network. This constant ensures that all consumers will always choose to join
one of the two mobile networks if it’s value is high enough. Disregarding fixed
utilities, let’s define net variable consumer surplus wi as:
wi ≡ω(pi, Ri)− pi · d(pi, Ri)
+ ω̃(Pi, ri)− ri ·D(Pi, ri)− fi, i = 1, 2. (2.27)
A customer located as x is indifferent between the two mobile networks if
wi − tx2 = wj − t(1− x)2. (2.28)







i = 1, 2 (2.29)
The profit functions of the mobile networks and the fixed-line network
are:
πi ≡si (pi − co − θiτ) · d(pi, Ri) + si
(
ri − ct − (1−Θi)τ
) ·D(Pi, ri)










Ri − CT − (1− θi)τ




2.3 The Benchmark: Efficient Allocation
For future reference, I derive the social optimum. Consider an idealized
situation in which a benevolent regulator chooses the market shares and the
volume of calls. In this symmetric setup, equal market division minimizes the
average consumer’s disutility from not being able to consume his preferred
service.
Let’s define T (si) as the average consumer’s disutility from not being
able to consume her preferred service.7 Using disutilities (2.24), for arbitrary
si, this measure of the distance between preferred and actual brand choice is:

















T (si) is minimized at si =
1
2












[−3 + 6si] = 0 (2.33)




E{U(Q)+ Ũ(q)+εq+u(q)+ ũ(Q)+εQ−(CO +τ +ct)Q−(co +τ +CT )q}
(2.34)
The optimal volume Q̂ and q̂ are determined by:
U ′(Q̂) + ũ′(Q̂) = CO + τ + ct (2.35)
u′(q̂) + Ũ ′(q̂) = co + τ + CT (2.36)
7See Laffont et al. (1998a)
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The sum of the marginal utilities for the caller and receiver should be equal
to the marginal cost of a call. Since I assume that ũ′(·) = βU ′(·) and Ũ ′(·) =
Bu′(·),
U ′(Q̂) =








Suppose that the meet-points are arranged symmetrically before the
networks compete in their retail market. This symmetry is reasonable be-
cause arranged meet-points are highly likely to be detected by the third party,
including a potential regulator.8
θ1 = θ2 = θ (2.39)
Θ1 = Θ2 = Θ (2.40)
In this case, the fixed-line monopoly network will choose its retail prices by
the regulation schedule:





R2 = R2 = g
(
CT + (1− θ)τ) = R (2.42)
The profit function of a mobile network can be expressed using the
definition of net variable consumer surplus, wi from equation (2.27). Instead
8See Atkinson and Barnekov (2001).
46










(pi − co − θτ) · d(pi, R)
+
(
ri − ct − (1−Θ)τ
) ·D(P, ri)
+ ω(pi, R)− pi · d(pi, R) + ω̃(P, ri)− ri ·D(P, ri)
− wi − cf
}
, i = 1, 2 (2.43)
The first order conditions (FOCs) are as below. The FOC with respect to fi























































ũ′(·) + ε− ct − (1−Θ)τ} Q′i(
ri − ε
β







(−co − θτ) · d(pi, R) +
(−ct − (1−Θ)τ) ·D(P, ri)











Lemma 6. (No Cornered Solution) ∀i, si 6= 0, given (θ1 = θ2, Θ1 = Θ2) :
In the mobile market there does not exist a cornered-market equilibrium when
meet-points are symmetric.
Proof. See Appendix A.
9See Laffont et al. (1998a).
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6= 0, i = 1, 2, i 6= j. (2.47)
Because pi = u
′(·) (2.9) and ri = ũ′(·) + ε (2.11) in equilibrium, FOCs (2.44)








t + (1−Θ)τ = r∗ (2.49)
If the disturbance term ε vanishes to zero this can be an equilibrium.10 By






















)− si = 0, i = 1, 2. (2.50)
Then, the equilibrium fixed-fee is:
fi = c
f + 2t · si, i = 1, 2 (2.51)
The equilibrium consumer surplus for mobile users is:
wi = ω(p
∗, R)+ω̃(P, r∗)−p∗·d(p∗, R)−r∗·D(P, r∗)−cf−2t·si, i = 1, 2. (2.52)










− s∗i + s∗j , i = 1, 2, i 6= j
10See Jeon et al. (2004) for details.
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, i = 1, 2 (2.53)
Now, let’s go back to equilibrium fixed-fee and consumer surpluses :
f ∗1 = f
∗
2 =c




∗, R) + ω̃(P, r∗)− p∗ · d(p∗, R)− r∗ ·D(P, r∗)− f ∗ = w∗
(2.55)
For future reference, let’s define social welfare as the sum of the profits







siwi + Π + W (2.56)
By putting all the solutions into the profit function (2.43), the equilibrium





, i = 1, 2
The equilibrium profit of the perfectly regulated fixed-line network is zero.
Π∗ = 0
The mobile network consumer’s net surplus is:
w∗ = ω(p∗, R) + ω̃(P, r∗)− p∗ · d(p∗, R)− r∗ ·D(P, r∗)− f ∗
The fixed-line network consumer’s net surplus in equilibrium is:
W ∗ =
{








Then, equilibrium social welfare is:
TS∗ =t +
{




Ω(P, r∗) + Ω̃(p∗, R)− P ·D(P, r∗)−R · d(p∗, R)− F
}
(2.57)
where P = g(CO + Θτ), R = g(CT + (1− θ)τ), F = CF
p∗ = co + θτ, r∗ = ct + (1−Θ)τ, f ∗ = cf + t.
I will explain about social welfare in section 2.6.
Here, I summarize equilibrium prices with a proposition:
Proposition 4. (Characterization of Market Equilibrium) There ex-
ists an equilibrium in which mobile networks set their receiver’s and caller’s
prices at the cost level, given θ1 = θ2, Θ1 = Θ2, Pi = f(C
O + Θiτ), Ri =
f(CT + (1− θi)τ) and F = CF .
i) p∗i = c
o + θτ = p∗j
ii) r∗i = c
t + (1−Θ)τ = r∗j
iii) f ∗i = c
f + t = f ∗j
However, the above market equilibrium does not guarantee an efficient
allocation in the presence of non-vanishing noise. For example, in the caller-
determined-volume region for mobile-to-fixed calls,
u′(q) = p =co + θτ (2.58)
Ũ ′(q) + ε ≥ R =CT + (1− θ)τ. (2.59)
On the other hand, in the receiver-determined-volume region,
u′(q) ≥ p =co + θτ (2.60)
Ũ ′(q) + ε = R =CT + (1− θ)τ. (2.61)
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In any case, the sum of the marginal utilities almost always exceed the marginal
cost. Communications service is provided under the socially optimal level.
u′(q) + Ũ ′(q) + ε > p + R = co + τ + CT (2.62)
In the next section, I will explain how to implement an efficient al-
location by choosing the proper meet-points corresponding to the receivers’
utilities, assuming vanishing noise.
2.5 Optimal Meet-Points
In the previous section, mobile firms set their prices at cost level given
symmetric meet-points, θi = θj = θ and Θi = Θj = Θ and information about
the relative size of the receivers’ utilities, β and B. Finding the real values
of β and B is an empirical problem and is beyond this paper’s scope. Then,
what are the socially optimal meet-points, θ and Θ, given β and B?
From the efficient allocation conditions (2.37) and (2.38) in section 2.3,
U ′(Q̂) =






(co + τ + CT ) (2.64)
Assuming vanishing noise, the fixed-line network is regulated to set
retail prices by rules (2.2) and (2.3), given (Θ, θ). In equilibrium,
U ′(Q) =P = g(CO + Θτ) (2.65)
Ũ ′(q) =R = g(CT + (1− θ)τ). (2.66)
Suppose the regulator sets the retail prices of the fixed-line network at cost
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level.
g(CO + Θτ) =CO + Θτ (2.67)
g(CT + (1− θ)τ) =CT + (1− θ)τ (2.68)
By combining the above equations with efficient allocation conditions (2.63)
and (2.64),
CO + Θτ =P =
CO + τ + ct
(1 + β)
(2.69)
CT + (1− θ)τ =R = B
1 + B
(co + τ + CT ). (2.70)
Then the optimal meet-points are:
Θ̂ =




CT + τ −Bco
(1 + B)τ
(2.72)
Notice that these optimal meet-points can be greater than 1 when β or B
is small enough. For example, examine equation (2.71). Since a small β
indicates a small receiver’s utility, optimality requires that the caller pay a
part of termination costs (ct) as well as the whole transport cost (τ).
I summarize the above results in this proposition:
Proposition 5. (Optimal Meet-Points and Efficient Allocation) When
the regulator requires marginal-cost pricing for the monopoly fixed-line network,
one can derive optimal meet-points (Θ̂, θ̂) to maximize total surplus (social wel-
fare) as the following:
Θ̂ =
ct + τ − βCO
(1 + β)τ
θ̂ =
CT + τ −Bco
(1 + B)τ
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Remark 1. (Properties of the Optimal Meet-points) From the optimal
meet-points one can know four properties:
i) ∂Θ̂
∂β



















R 0 if B R CT
co
First, It’s natural that the caller’s burden decreases as the receiver’s utility
increases. Second, an increase in origination costs decreases the portion of
transport cost (Θ̂, θ̂) paid by the caller. Third, an increase in termination
costs increases the portion of transport cost (Θ̂, θ̂) paid by the caller. Fourth,
the effect of transport cost depends on the relative size of origination and ter-
mination costs.
Proposition 5 is consistent with DeGraba (2003). DeGraba’s Propo-







, PR = MCR and PC = MCC (2.73)
where superscript R indicates the receiver and C indicates the caller. This
condition shows that the ratio of the marginal utilities of the receiver and
caller should be the same as the ratio of marginal costs paid by each party as
its service price. In my model, the above condition (2.73) can be interpreted
as the following: for i = 1, 2,
ũ′(Q)
U ′(Q)
≡ β = c
t + (1−Θ)τ
CO + Θτ
, r = ct + (1−Θ)τ and P = CO + Θτ (2.74)
Ũ ′(q)
u′(q)
≡ B = C
T + (1− θ)τ
co + θτ
, R = CT + (1− θ)τ and p = co + θτ. (2.75)
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One can derive the result of Proposition 5 from the above equations.11 Using
a different network model, I obtain a result equivalent to DeGraba (2003).
If the regulator can apply the optimal meet-points corresponding to the
receiver’s utility, the Bill-and-Keep system yields a socially optimal market
equilibrium in which all prices are at cost level and the telecommunications
service is provided properly.
2.6 Welfare Implications
In this section, I compare the CPP regime with Bill-and-Keep regime.
Let’s begin with optimality conditions in terms of retail prices from equations
(2.74) and (2.75) :
r∗ = βP (2.76)
R = Bp∗ (2.77)
Still assuming vanishing noise, in a socially optimal equilibrium the call vol-
umes are determined such that calling demand and receiving demand are equal:
Q̂ = QC = QR (2.78)




q̂ = qC = qR (2.79)




11In Jeon et al. (2004), they show optimal access charges equivalent to these optimal
meet-points using state-contingent receiving utilities.
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Considering the above optimal volumes and vanishing noise, the optimal social









U(Q̂) + Ũ(q̂))− P · Q̂−R · q̂ − F
}
(2.80)
where the retail tariffs for the fixed-line network are regulated and retail tar-
iff for mobile networks are market-determined. Note the application of the
optimal meet-points as derived in the previous section.
P =CO + Θ̂τ ≡ PBK
R =CT + (1− θ̂)τ ≡ RBK
F =CF
p∗ =co + θ̂τ ≡ pBK
r∗ =ct + (1− Θ̂)τ ≡ rBK
f ∗ =cf + t
Hereafter, I use superscript “BK” for Bill-and-Keep results.
Now, let’s review the market results under the CPP regime. Under
the CPP regime, access charges are allowed between interconnecting networks
but receiver’s prices and meet-points are not allowed. In the previous chapter,
I study the same model except that the CPP regime is applied instead of
Bill-and-Keep. In that CPP model, the market equilibrium tariffs are as the
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following:
P cpp =CO + τ + am (2.81)
F cpp =CF (2.82)
pcpp =co + τ + CT (2.83)
f cpp =co + t− (am − ct)Q(P cpp) (2.84)
where am is the monopoly level access charge. Then, the equilibrium call
volumes are the following:
Qcpp =Q(CO + τ + am) (2.85)
qcpp =q(co + τ + CT ) (2.86)
Therefore, consumer surpluses under CPP are:
W cpp =U(Qcpp) + Ũ(qcpp)− P cpp ∗Qcpp − F cpp (2.87)
wcpp =u(qcpp) + ũ(Qcpp)− pcpp ∗ qcpp − f cpp (2.88)
The fixed-line network is regulated so that it cannot have any profit, and the
mobile networks have only Hotelling profit, t
2
, under either regime.





By summing up the profits and consumer surpluses, the social welfare level
under CPP is the following:
TScpp =t +
{








The Bill-and-Keep regime can achieve social optimum when the opti-
mal meet-points are arranged. It is therefore clear that the Bill-and-Keep is
welfare-superior to CPP. First, the call volume under the Bill-and-Keep regime
is larger than the call volume under the CPP regime because PBK < P cpp and
pBK < pcpp. See Lemma 7.
Q̂ ≡ Q(PBK) > Q(P cpp) (2.92)
q̂ ≡ q(pBK) > q(pcpp) (2.93)
Lemma 7.
(














CO + Θ̂τ < CO + τ + am
)
to hold, we need Θ̂ <
τ+am
τ
. Since am ≥ ct, we need to show just Θ̂ < τ+ct
τ
. The optimal meet-point
is Θ̂ = c
t+τ−βCO
(1+β)τ














always holds if B > 0.
Second, the prices paid by the caller and receiver under the Bill-and-
Keep regime with optimal meet-points is less than or equal to what callers
have to pay under CPP.
PBK + rBK = CO + τ + ct < CO + τ + am = P cpp (2.94)
pBK + RBK = co + τ + CT = co + τ + CT = pcpp (2.95)
Proposition 6. (Welfare Superiority of Bill-and-Keep) Bill-and-Keep




> TScpp if B > 0 and β > 0
57
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now, let’s see who is the beneficiary of the Bill-and-Keep regime. Note
that in this model, firms are not better off after introducing Bill-and-Keep. The
fixed-line network has no profits and the mobile networks have only Hotelling
profits. This means that the additional social welfare generated by the Bill-
and-Keep regime goes only to consumers and not to the producers. In other
words, only consumer surpluses are enhanced by the regime.
It’s not completely clear whether the fixed-line subscribers or the mobile
subscribers are greater beneficiaries. But a clue is found from the equilibrium
prices under the CPP regime.12 Under the CPP regime, the mobile users are
subsidized by the fixed-line users. Part of what the fixed-line users pay goes to
mobile users through the fixed-fee: (am− ct)Q(P cpp). By introducing the Bill-
and-Keep, the benefit-loss relation between the mobile users and the fixed-line
users disappears. This suggests that the benefit of the Bill-and-Keep system
might go to fixed-line users rather than to mobile users. It’s a reasonable
suggestion because often the most distorted parts of an economy experience
greater benefits after correcting the distortion.
2.7 Conclusion
Existing literature finds that under the CPP regime, call externalities
are ignored and the distortions created by abnormally high access charges is
hard to cure, because the regime requires the caller or calling network to pay all
the costs of a call. This paper studies the interconnection between a regulated
12See equations (2.81) and (2.84).
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fixed-line network and competitive mobile networks. I apply the Bill-and-Keep
regime into my model following Jeon et al. (2004)’s model which deals with
the RPP regime. The RPP regime allows networks to collect a receiver’s price
from their own subscribers in addition to receiving access charges from the
calling networks. Bill-and-Keep is different in that it does not allow access
charges but it requires the receiver to pay the termination costs. I show that
by introducing a Bill-and-Keep regime, the call externalities and access market
distortion can be cured if proper meet-points corresponding to the receivers’
utilities are implemented. In my model, because the fixed-line network is
perfectly regulated and mobile firms are competitive on their retail market,
the benefits of Bill-and-Keep go only to consumers and not to firms.
Even though the Bill-and-Keep regime is shown to bring an efficient al-
location in this model, it’s difficult for regulators to have complete information
about the receivers’ utilities. Therefore, some practical Bill-and-Keep policies
are suggested assuming the size of the receivers’ utilities.13 I expect that the
evaluation of these practical regimes will be explored by future research.
13See DeGraba (2000) for COBAK and DeGraba (2003) for MBAK.
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Chapter 3
An Examination of Practical Bill-and-Keep
Policies between Fixed-line and Mobile
Networks
3.1 Introduction
In the telecommunications market, the Calling Party Pays (CPP) regime
has two standard problems: a monopoly of access charges and call externali-
ties. Under this regime, the calling network must pay an access charge to the
receiving network, which has a monopoly on the ability to deliver calls to its
subscribers. This problem must be controlled through complicated regulatory
efforts. The call externality arises, because although the receiver is one of two
beneficiaries of a call, he does not pay for the call. On the other hand, under
a Bill-and-Keep regime, the access market itself is not allowed and the call
externality can be eliminated by making both the receiver and the caller share
the cost of a call. However, the Bill-and-Keep regime has a meet-point decision
problem: how to divide and share the transport cost between the two central
offices of the calling and receiving networks. If a regulator has sufficient in-
formation about the relative sizes of the utilities of the receiver and the caller
as well as information about the cost structures of all the telecommunications
networks, an optimal meet-point can be obtained and implemented in the real
economy.
Unfortunately, regulators do not have that much information. Because
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of this, some practical meet-point policies have been suggested: Central Office
Bill and Keep (COBAK) and Meet-Point Bill and Keep (MBAK). These pro-
grams are “practical” in that they can be implemented in the real economy,
because they rely on information that can be easily obtained by regulators.
COBAK and MBAK do not require information about consumers’ utilities or
firms’ cost structures; instead, they make assumptions about that informa-
tion, such as symmetric cost structure between interconnecting networks and
an equal distribution of call value between the caller and the receiver. If these
assumptions are accepted, deciding the meet-points only requires information
about the transport cost, which is relatively easy to detect.
According to Atkinson and Barnekov (2001), telecommunications ser-
vice carriers have had little difficulty identifying incremental facilities required
for transport. Once a clear rule is stated, negotiation between carriers gen-
erally produces efficient solutions, and third parties can objectively evaluate
which party more closely complies with the rule. Under this model, it is
expected that regulators would rarely need to resolve disputes between inter-
connecting networks.
There are substantial research on the Bill-and-Keep regime. DeGraba
(2000) suggests the Central Office Bill and Keep (COBAK) to replace the
flawed existing interconnection regimes. In this paper, the so called “COBAK
proposal”, DeGraba suggests that the calling network or the calling party
should pay all the transport costs between the two central offices of the inter-
connecting networks as well as the origination costs of its own network. He
further suggests that the receiving network or the receiving party should pay
only the termination costs of its own network.
Wright (2002b) criticizes COBAK, because he claims that it fails to
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apply Ramsey principles to the recovery of joint costs and therefore a Bill-
and-Keep regime is not necessarily better than a CPP regime, since the called
party may often have a much lower willingness to pay than the calling party.
DeGraba (2003) shows that a Bill-and-Keep regime that equally divides
the cost of a call between both parties results in the first-best utilization when
customers equally share the benefit of each call and competing carriers have
access to the same technology. This is the Meet-Point Bill-and-Keep (MBAK).
Atkinson and Barnekov (2000) insist that the mid-point should be the solution
of the meet-point decision, if negotiation between both parties does not work.
This is exactly the same as the MBAK recommendation. These two papers
suggest the mid-point, because they assume that the costs of both networks
are symmetric and that the receiver’s utility is as much as the caller’s utility
for a call.
It is the assumption about the size of the receiver’s utility that creates
the differences between the opposing claims of Wright (2002b) and DeGraba
(2003). DeGraba (2003) says that, since the receiver obtains almost the util-
ity as the caller, MBAK can be efficient. Wright (2002b) claims that since
the receiver’s utility is close to zero, call externalities are very small and a
CPP regime that makes the calling party pay for the whole cost is closer to
optimality than Bill-and-Keep.
In the previous chapter, I build a traditional network interconnection
model between a fixed-line network and mobile networks in which a Bill-and-
Keep regime is applied instead of the CPP without any assumptions about
the size of the receiver’s utility. I show that the Bill-and-Keep regime can
be superior to the CPP if a proper meet-point is chosen corresponding to the
given size of the receiver’s utility. I derive an optimal meet-point between a
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fixed-line network and mobile networks.
It is difficult to have information on the receiver’s utility and the costs
of networks. Furthermore, the costs are very likely to be asymmetric between
two different style networks, such as a fixed-line network and a mobile network.
In this chapter, I allow asymmetric costs between interconnecting networks1,
and I use a range for the relative size of the receiver’s utility to the caller’s
utility. Using a specific example, I examine whether the practical Bill-and-
Keep policies such as COBAK and MBAK yield a higher total surplus than the
CPP. Furthermore, I try to evaluate which specific meet-point policy, COBAK
or MBAK, is better for the real economy.
First, I show that a practical Bill-and-Keep regime yields a higher total
surplus than a market-driven CPP if the receiver’s utility is fairly large. Sec-
ond, I compare performances of COBAK and MBAK and show that COBAK
is a safer policy than MBAK, because (1) it provides a larger total surplus for
a small receiver’s utility, and (2) the performance of a practical Bill-and-Keep
approaches that of an optimal Bill-and-Keep as the receiver’s utility increases.
3.2 The Calling Party Pays Regime
This model is based on Chapter 1. I add a noise variable in the receiver’s
utility and derive equilibrium and efficient allocation. This model is used to
obtain total surplus for a CPP regime in Section 3.4.




Assume that the telecommunications market has only two kinds of net-
works: fixed-line and mobile. The fixed-line network is a monopoly and the
mobile market has two symmetric and competitive firms. The payment sys-
tem of the telecommunications market is the CPP system, which means that
callers pay for the calls. See Figure 3.1. In the traditional telecommunications
models under CPP, callers are assumed to be the only party to benefit from the
calls; however, receivers clearly benefit from the calls, too. Note that because
under the CPP regime receivers do not pay for their benefits, call externalities
arise. To show the call externalities explicitly, I assume that receivers derive
utility from the calls but do not pay for calls and that they do not hang up
first. Therefore, the callers determine the call length.
All calls made from mobile networks are terminated on the fixed-line
network, and all calls originating on the fixed-line network are terminated on
one of the mobile networks. To allow a focus on the interaction between the
fixed-line and the mobile networks, on-net calls in each network and mobile-
to-mobile calls are ignored. Since they need access to each other’s network to
complete their outgoing calls, two-way access markets exist: mobile-to-fixed
and fixed-to-mobile.
The costs to complete calls are assumed to be composed of three parts:
origination, termination and transport. See Figure 3.1. Origination cost co is
a per-minute cost generated in the mobile network when a subscriber makes
a call. The termination cost ct is a per-minute cost generated in the mobile
network when one of its subscribers receives a call. The two mobile networks
have symmetric cost structures. The fixed-line network has a different cost
structure than the mobile networks. CO and CT are, respectively, the orig-
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ination and termination costs for the fixed-line network. Transport cost τ
is a per-minute cost between the two central office switches of the involved
networks. Note that the origination or termination cost includes the cost gen-
erated in each party’s central office switch. The transport cost is covered by
the calling network.2 I assume that the transport cost is the same between
the fixed-line network and either mobile network and is symmetric between a
fixed-to-mobile call and a mobile-to-fixed call.
I assume that there aren’t any universal fixed costs to reflect a joint and
common cost of serving the various customers for each network. But mobile
networks have a fixed cost cf per subscriber, which reflects the monthly cost
of connecting the customer to the network as well as billing and servicing the
customer. CF is a fixed cost per subscriber for the fixed-line network.
2In some sense, under the CPP regime, the origination cost includes the transport cost.
I separate them to compare this regime with the Bill-and-Keep regime, under which sharing
of transport cost becomes an issue.
65
It is assumed that the access charge of mobile-to-fixed network A is
regulated at termination cost level CT .
A = CT (3.1)
Each mobile network freely charges access charge ai to the fixed-line network.
For each network, demand for outgoing calls depends only on the price
of an outgoing call and not on the price for incoming calls, which is paid by
the customers of the other network. Callers do not care about their calling
partners’ utilities. Given that each customer has the same marginal willingness
to pay for calling and the same utility of receiving calls, every mobile network
can offer uniform tariff for the overall use of its services. The fixed-fee F for
the fixed-line network is regulated at the fixed cost level, CF .
F = CF (3.2)
The fixed-line network is regulated to set its fixed-to-mobile retail prices pro-
portional to the access charge each mobile firm sets: ai and aj. Suppose the
fixed-line network offers its subscribers a per-minute usage charge Pi for mak-
ing calls to mobile network i, which is described by a function of total costs,
Pi ≡ g(CO + τ + ai), g′ > 0 (3.3)
This is obviously true in the case when fixed-to-mobile prices are regulated
at variable cost level, CO + τ + ai. On the other hand, each mobile network
charges its subscribers a monthly fixed-fee fi and a per-minute charge pi for
making mobile-to-fixed calls. Suppose that once a subscriber has joined a
mobile network with usage charge pi, that subscriber makes q(pi) minutes of
outbound calls to a fixed-line user. Each fixed-line network subscriber makes
Q(Pi) minute calls to a user of mobile network i.
66
A fixed set of homogeneous customers subscribe to the telecommunica-
tions services. For simplification, I assume that the fixed-line network has N
subscribers and mobile networks divide another N subscribers into two groups,
N1 and N2. This N can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality and then
N1 and N2 can be understood as market shares si and sj. Notice that full
market participation is assumed respectively in the fixed-line market and in
the mobile market and, as a result, si +sj = 1 always holds. In this framework
each market has no network externalities.
Consumer preferences are known to firms. Mobile service and fixed-
line service each provide different utilities. For example, mobile phone service
gives subscribers mobility in addition to the usual utility of calls. Therefore,
I assume that the utility function of fixed-line network subscribers is different
from that of mobile network subscribers. Subscribers of each network benefit
from outgoing and incoming calls separably. For fixed-line network subscribers
and mobile network subscribers, their concave utilities from making calls are:
U(Qi) and u(qi), i = 1, 2
where Qi is the length of fixed-to-mobile calls and qi is the length of mobile-
to-fixed calls between each pair of caller and receiver. To be consistent with
the Bill-and-Keep model in the next section, I use a receiver’s utility that is
subject to noise, expressed by a random variable ε.3 For i = 1, 2,
Ũ(qi) + εqi (3.4)
ũ(Qi) + εQi (3.5)
3In this CPP regime, the noise does not affect equilibrium since networks do not set the
receiver’s prices, which would be affected by this disturbance term.
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where ε follows the distribution function Ψ(·) with wide enough support [ε, ε̄],
zero mean and density ψ(·), which is strictly positive for all ε in [ε, ε̄]. Further-
more, I assume that the noise ε is identically and independently distributed for
each caller-receiver pair. The expected utility from receiving calls is assumed
to be proportional to the calling-utility of the caller in the corresponding net-
work. This is only for technical simplicity.
Ũ(qi) ≡ B · u(qi), B > 0 (3.6)
ũ(Qi) ≡ β · U(Qi), β > 0 (3.7)
B is an expected ratio of the receiver’s utility to caller’s utility for a mobile-
to-fixed call. Analogously, β is this ratio for a fixed-to-mobile call.
The utility of a consumer with income y joining the fixed-line network
is given by:





U(Qi)− PiQi + Ũ(qi) + εqi
}
− F. (3.8)
V0 is a fixed utility enjoyed by a fixed-line user from subscribing to the fixed-
line network.4
The market share of each mobile network, si, is determined by network
competition for subscribers, which can be explained by the Hotelling product
differentiation model. Assume that mobile customers are endowed with a value
of x, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Two
mobile networks are located at each end point of this unit interval, respectively.
A mobile customer with value x has extra disutility from not being able to
consume his preferred services,
tx2 and t(1− x)2 (3.9)
4V0 is assumed to be high enough that all consumers join this network.
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for network 1 and 2 respectively, where t is the parameter that measures how
differentiated the networks are. The greater t is, the greater are the switching
costs, and the harder it is for one firm to steal away customers from the rival
firm by lowering its price. The utility derived by a consumer with income y
located at x from joining either mobile network i or j is respectively given by:
y + v0 − tx2 + u(qi)− piqi + ũ(Qi) + εQi − fi (3.10)
y + v0 − t(1− x)2 + u(qj)− pjqj + ũ(Qj) + εQj − fj (3.11)
v0 is a fixed utility, which a mobile network user has from subscribing to a
mobile network.5 fi is a fixed-fee which the mobile user has to pay for every
billing period. Disregarding fixed utility, define net variable consumer surplus
wi as:
wi ≡ u(qi)− piqi + ũ(Qi) + εQi − fi, i = 1, 2. (3.12)
A customer located at x is indifferent between the two mobile networks if
wi − tx2 = wj − t(1− x)2.








Defining the indirect utility for fixed-to-mobile calls Qi and mobile-to-
fixed calls qi as:











, i = 1, 2, (3.15)
5The constant vo ensures that all consumers will always choose to join one of the two
mobile networks if it is high enough.
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demand functions of Q(Pi) and q(pi) for the calls per subscriber can be derived.
Then,
V ′(Pi) = −Q(Pi) and v′(pi) = −q(pi) i = 1, 2.







V (Pi) + Ũ(q(pi)) + εq(pi)
}
− F (3.16)
wi ≡ v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi)) + εQ(Pi)− fi, i = 1, 2. (3.17)















Notice that the price of fixed–to-mobile call Pi can affect the mobile market
shares because mobile subscribers have utilities from receiving calls originated
in the fixed-line network, ũ(Q(Pi)) + εQ(Pi).
Access charges are chosen first, and then, taking these as given, firms
choose their retail tariffs non-cooperatively. Given the access charges (ai, aj, A),
each mobile firm chooses its tariff, (pi, fi) or (pj, fj). On the other hand, retail
tariffs for the fixed-line network, (Pi, Pj, F ) are regulated according to (3.2)
and (3.3), given (ai, aj, A).
Since the total number of customers N can be normalized to one, all
demands and profits can be understood as a per-customer unit: Q(Pi), q(pi),
Π, πi.
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3.2.2 The Benchmark: Efficient Allocation
I derive the social optimum for future reference. This efficient allocation
is the same under both CPP and Bill-and-Keep regimes, since all utilities and
cost structures are the same. Consider an idealized situation in which a social
planner chooses the market shares and the volume of calls. In this symmetric
setup, equal market division minimizes the average consumer’s disutility from
not being able to consume his preferred service.
Let’s define T (si) as the average consumer’s disutility from not being
able to consume her preferred service. Using disutilities (3.9), for arbitrary
si, this measure of the distance between preferred and actual brand choice is
given by:
T (si) ≡ t
[




T (si) is minimized at si =
1
2






[−3 + 6si] = 0 (3.20)
The social planner would choose the volume of calls so as to maximize





U(Q)+Ũ(q)+εq+u(q)+ ũ(Q)+εQ−(CO +τ +ct)Q−(co+τ +CT )q
}
(3.21)
The optimal volumes Q̂ and q̂ are determined by:
U ′(Q̂) + ũ′(Q̂) = CO + τ + ct (3.22)
u′(q̂) + Ũ ′(q̂) = co + τ + CT (3.23)
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Since ũ′(·) = βU ′(·) and Ũ ′(·) = Bu′(·),
U ′(Q̂) =








Let’s start with the second stage, in which given (ai, aj, A) mobile firms
choose their own retail tariffs simultaneously. In the second-stage game, mobile
network i sets expected-profit-maximizing tariff, (pi, fi), accepting (Pi, Pj) and













pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ fi − cf
}]
(3.26)
Using equation (3.17), wi ≡ v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi)) + εQ(Pi) − fi, the optimization
problem of each mobile network can be solved with respect to pi and wi, instead

















pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi)) + εQ(Pi)− wi − cf
}]
(3.27)
The first order conditions (FOCs) of each mobile network are the following.








































pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ (v(pi) + ũ(Q(Pi))− wi)− cf
}









pi − co − τ − CT
)
+ fi − cf
}
= 0 (3.29)
Since cornered-market equilibrium does not exist6, from the FOC (3.28),
the usage price is set at marginal cost according to the two-part tariff problem:
p∗i = c
o + τ + CT , i = 1, 2. (3.30)
Combining the above result (3.30) with the FOC (3.29), the equilibrium fixed-
fee is:
f ∗i = c




, i = 1, 2. (3.31)
Furthermore, this is a unique equilibrium for any given (ai, aj) and (A,Pi, Pj, F ).
7
Note that the noise in receiver’s utility does not affect the equilibrium tariffs
of mobile networks. From now on, all the results are the same as the case
without the noise.
The retail prices of the fixed-line network are regulated by the equation







i − CO − τ − ai)Q(P ∗i ) (3.32)
where P ∗i = g(C
O + τ + ai), g
′ > 0.
6See Lemma 1 in Chapter 1 for details.
7See Lemma 2 in Chapter 1 for details.
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Because the fixed-line network is regulated, they cannot affect the mobile
market shares, even though the receiving-utility of mobile users depends on
the fixed-to-mobile retail prices.
Now at the first stage, given conditions (3.3), (3.30) and (3.31), each
mobile firm chooses its own access charge. The fixed-line network is regulated
to set its access charge at the termination cost level CT .
Mobile network i chooses its access charge ai, given aj. Considering the
tariffs of the mobile firms determined at the second stage, (3.30) and (3.31),
the maximization problem is:
max
ai
πi = 2t · s2i . (3.33)
The equilibrium profits of the mobile firms depend only on its market share,
but access charges affect this market share. Using the definition of net con-




i ) + ũ(Q(P
∗
i ))− cf − 2t · si + Q(P ∗i )(ai − ct), i = 1, 2. (3.34)
Since p∗i = c
o +τ +CT , v(p∗i ) = v(p
∗
j). Then, the market share is: for i, j = 1, 2





ũ(Q(P ∗i )) + (ai − ct)Q(P ∗i )− ũ(Q(P ∗j ))− (aj − ct)Q(P ∗j )
6t
.
Since P ∗i = g(C






ũ(Q(g(CO + τ + ai))) + (ai − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + ai))
6t
− ũ(Q(g(C




Using equation (3.33) and (3.35), the optimization problem of each mobile








ũ(Q(g(CO + τ + ai))) + (ai − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + ai))
6t
− ũ(Q(g(C

























= 0, i = 1, 2
(3.37)
where Pi = g(C
O + τ + ai). Since si 6= 0 and this is a unique and symmetric
equilibrium, access charge, a∗i = a
∗
j = a
∗8, should satisfy this condition.
Qi(g(C
O + τ + a∗)) +
(




O + τ + a∗))
∂a
= 0 (3.38)
From equation (3.38), ct− ∂ũ(Qi)
∂Qi
can be thought as “perceived marginal
costs,” which incorporates call externalities. This means that mobile networks
accept termination costs discounted by the negative effect of an access charge
on its own subscribers’ receiving-utility. Note that even though the access
charges are lower than the traditional monopoly level, mobile networks still
set inefficiently high access charges, creating a new monopoly level that in-
corporates the receiver’s utility. Under the CPP regime, these abnormally
high fixed-to-mobile access charges exist and regulatory efforts are necessary
to control them.
8See Lemma 3 in Chapter 1 for details.
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Since access charges are determined symmetrically in equilibrium, all
other equilibrium prices become symmetric. First, equilibrium fixed-to-mobile
retail prices are symmetric.
P ∗i = P
∗
j = g(C
O + τ + a∗) = P ∗ (3.39)
Note that since the usage price of fixed-to-mobile calls decreases due to low
mobile access charges, the level of fixed-to-mobile call volume, Q(P ∗), is greater
than it would be without including the receiving-utility of mobile users. The
fixed-fee of the fixed-line network is set at the cost level, F ∗ = CT .








Equilibrium prices for mobile-to-fixed calls are set at cost level and are sym-




O + τ + CT = p∗ (3.41)
Let’s look at the equilibrium fixed-fees of mobile firms, which are derived from
equations (3.31) and (3.40).
f ∗i = f
∗
j = c
f + t− (a∗ − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) = f ∗ (3.42)
In this model, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium (p∗i =
p∗j = p
∗, f ∗i = f
∗
j = f
∗, a∗i = a
∗
j = a
∗) which is characterized by these condi-
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tions,9
p∗ = co + τ + CT (3.43)
f ∗ = cf + t− (a∗ − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) (3.44)
Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) +
(
a∗ − ct + ∂ũ(Qi)
∂Qi
)
∂Q(g(CO + τ + a∗))
∂ai
= 0 (3.45)
From equation (3.33) and symmetric market shares, the equilibrium











o + τ + CT ) + ũ(Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)))− cf − t
+ (a∗ − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) (3.47)
=w∗
On the other hand, the monopoly fixed-line network is regulated. Since
their fixed-fee and access charge are set at the cost level, their equilibrium
profit is:
Π∗ = (P ∗ − CO − τ − a∗)Q(P ∗) + F − CF (3.48)
since P ∗i = P
∗
j = P
∗. If the fixed-line is perfectly regulated, P ∗ = g(CO + τ +
a∗) = CO + τ + a∗, its profit is zero.
A fixed-line network user has the following consumer surplus:
W ∗ = V (g(CO + τ + a∗)) + Ũ
(
q(co + τ + CT )
)− CF (3.49)
9See proposition 2 in Chapter 1 for details.
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which should be greater than the case that does not account for the receiving-
utility of mobile users because the calling volume is greater.
I define social welfare as sum of all profits and consumer surpluses:
TS∗ = π∗ + w∗ + Π∗ + W ∗ (3.50)
3.2.4 Optimal Access Charges
To implement the optimal outcome, the social planner can use symmet-
ric tariffs so as to achieve equal market division (si =
1
2
). Since the volume is
determined by the caller, from equations (3.22) and (3.23), the optimal volume
is obtained by choosing (P̂ , p̂) such that:
P̂ = U ′(Q̂) = CO + τ + ct − ũ′(Q̂) (3.51)
p̂ = u′(q̂) = co + τ + CT − Ũ ′(q̂) (3.52)
Under the CPP regime, callers should pay for the origination cost, transport
cost and access charges.
P̂ = CO + τ + â (3.53)
p̂ = co + τ + Â (3.54)
For optimality, access charges should be given by:
â = ct − ũ′(Q̂) (3.55)
Â = CT − Ũ ′(q̂) (3.56)
To satisfy the each industry’s break-even constraint, F and f should be ad-
justed.
Π = (Â− CT )q̂ + (P̂ − CO − τ − â)Q̂ + F̂ − CF = 0 (3.57)
π = (â− ct)Q̂ + (p̂− co − τ − Â)q + f̂ − cf = 0 (3.58)
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F̂ = CF + Ũ ′(q̂)q̂ (3.59)
f̂ = cf + ũ′(Q̂)Q̂ (3.60)
3.3 The Bill-and-Keep Regime
This model is the same as in Chapter 2. Market structure, cost struc-
ture and utilities in this model are the same as in the previous CPP model.
This model is used to obtain total surplus for the Bill-and-Keep regime in
Section 3.4.
3.3.1 The Model
In this model, the payment system of the telecommunications market
is the Bill-and-Keep system. Assuming that both caller and receiver benefit
from the calls, they both have to bear the costs raised in the network to which
they subscribe. As a result, it’s reasonable to assume that either the receiver
or the caller can hang up first. Since both the caller and the receiver pay
for a call, call externalities do not arise. This pricing system weakens the
appropriateness of access charges. If the receiving network recovers their cost
from their own subscribers, it’s hard to accept the access charge paid by the
calling network, because that is usually compensation for using the receiving
network. Therefore, I assume that networks do not pay any access charges.
Under the Bill-and-Keep regime, networks exchange traffic on a ‘Bill-
and-Keep’ basis at an arranged meet-point of the trunk line connecting the
networks, which means that each network pays part of the cost of operating a
single trunk line between the networks. As a result, setting a meet-point can
be understood as a cost-allocation between the related networks to maintain
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a trunk line. I assume that the meet-point between the two central offices is
arranged by a regulator or by both networks before the networks choose retail
prices, and this does not need to follow the COBAK or the MBAK system. I
assume the total transport cost is τ between the fixed-line network and either
mobile network. It is symmetric for both directions of a call. Mobile network i
pays θiτ of the transport cost when their subscribers make a call to the fixed-
line network, and the fixed-line network pays Θiτ when their subscribers make
a call to mobile network i. The receiving network pays the remaining portion
of τ . When meet-points are arranged between two central offices in the real
world, Θi and θi ∈ [0, 1]. However, notice that theoretically Θi and θi can be
negative or greater than 1, especially for optimality.
Given that each customer has the same marginal willingness to pay for
making or receiving calls, all mobile networks can offer a uniform tariff for
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the overall use of its services. As in the CPP model, the fixed-line network is
regulated. The fixed-fee F for the fixed-line network is regulated at the fixed
cost level, CF .
F ≡ CF
The fixed-line network is regulated such that its retail prices are proportional
to the costs, including the allocated transport costs. Suppose the fixed-line
network offers its subscribers a per-minute usage charge Pi for making calls to
mobile network i and Ri for receiving calls from mobile network i. These are
described by functions of the total costs, given meet-points (Θi, θi).
Pi ≡ g(CO + Θiτ) (3.61)
Ri ≡ g(CT + (1− θi)τ), g′ > 0 (3.62)
On the other hand, each mobile network charges its subscribers a monthly
fixed-fee fi and a per-minute charge pi for making calls to the fixed-line network
and ri for receiving calls from the fixed-line network. Mobile networks choose
their own tariffs non-cooperatively. Suppose that once a subscriber has joined
a mobile network with usage charge (pi, ri), that subscriber wants to make
q(pi) minutes of outbound calls to a fixed-line user and receive Q(ri) minutes of
inbound calls from a fixed-line user for a billing period. Each fixed-line network
subscriber wants to make Q(Pi) minutes of outbound calls to a subscriber in
mobile network i and wants to receive q(Ri) minutes of inbound calls from a
subscriber in mobile network i.
Consumer preferences are the same as in the CPP model. Calling-
utilities are:
U(Qi) and u(qi), i = 1, 2
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Receiving-utilities are:
Ũ(qi) + εqi (3.63)
ũ(Qi) + εQi (3.64)
where
Ũ(qi) ≡ B · u(qi), B > 0 (3.65)
ũ(Qi) ≡ β · U(Qi), β > 0 (3.66)
Since the receivers have to pay for incoming calls in a Bill-and-Keep model, it
is reasonable to assume that the receivers can hang up whenever they want.
Both the caller and the receiver have positive probability of hanging up first
– so called “caller’s sovereignty” and “receiver’s sovereignty.” As a result, the
volume of calls is non-cooperatively decided by callers and receivers.
Given (Pi, Ri, pi, ri) and a realized value of ε, unless the receiver hangs
up the call first, the caller will continue the call until her marginal utility is
equal to the calling price. For i = 1, 2,
U ′(Qi) = Pi (3.67)
u′ (qi) = pi. (3.68)
Similarly, unless the caller hangs up the call first, the receiver with noise ε will
continue the call until her marginal utility is equal to the receiving-price. For
i = 1, 2,
Ũ ′(qi) + ε = Ri (3.69)
ũ′(Qi) + ε = ri. (3.70)
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Suppose a subscriber of the fixed-line network calls a subscriber of
mobile network i. Given the caller’s price Pi, the receiver’s price ri and a
realized value of ε, if the caller does not hang up the call first, Pi is not greater
than her marginal utility U ′. In this case, the receiver with noise ε will continue
the call until her marginal utility is equal to ri. Namely, the receiver consumes
the volume of calls which satisfies above equation (3.70). Let’s say this volume
quantity QRi . With the volume of calls Q
R
i , the caller has marginal utility of








Since Pi is less than or equal to
ri−ε
β
(low ε), the receiver determines the volume
of calls, and the consumed volume is QRi = Qi(
ri−ε
β
), which is the receiver’s
demand function. On the other hand, if the caller’s price Pi is greater than
this marginal utility level U ′(QRi ) =
ri−ε
β
(high ε), the caller determines the
volume of calls by (3.67) and the consumed volume of calls is QCi = Qi(Pi),
which is the caller’s demand function.
ri − ε
β
≤ U ′(QCi ) = Pi (3.72)
Therefore, the volume of calls from the fixed-line network to mobile network i
is determined by the following equation. For i = 1, 2,

















D(Pi, ri) = Qi(max{Pi, ri − ε
β
}). (3.74)
A larger ε increases the possibility of the caller’s sovereignty with realized
volume Qi (Pi), and a smaller ε increases the possibility of the receiver’s
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sovereignty with realized volume Qi(
ri−ε
β
). Similarly, the volume of opposite-
direction calls – calls from mobile network i to the fixed-line network – is for
i = 1, 2,
d(pi, Ri) = qi(max{pi, Ri − ε
B
}). (3.75)
The above two volumes can be expressed as demand functions:
















In equation (3.76), the first term on the right hand side represents the expected
demand for fixed-to-mobile calls for large values of ε, such that the caller on
the fixed-line network is the one that terminates the call. The second term is
the expected fixed-to-mobile demand for small values of ε, where the receiver
on mobile network i hangs up first. The first term on the right hand side
of equation (3.77) represents the expected demand for mobile-to-fixed calls
for high values of ε, where the caller on mobile network i terminates. The
second term is expected demand over the range of ε where the receiver on the
fixed-line network terminates the call.
Similarly the utilities of the fixed-line network subscriber making calls
to mobile network i and mobile network i’s subscriber making calls to the
fixed-line network are, respectively, given by:











ψ(ε)dε, i = 1, 2 (3.78)
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ψ(ε)dε, i = 1, 2. (3.79)
I now define the receiver’s utility before payment. The utilities of the fixed-line
network subscriber receiving calls from mobile network i and mobile network
i’s subscriber receiving calls from the fixed-line network are given, respectively,

















































Assume that all utilities are separably additive. Ignoring fixed utilities,













Ω̃(pi, Ri)−Ri · d(pi, Ri)
}
− F (3.82)
As in the CPP model, the mobile market share, si, is determined by
network competition for subscribers, which can be explained by the Hotelling
product differentiation model. The utility derived by a consumer with income
10Note that the definitions of surplus in the Bill-and-Keep model are different from the
CPP model even though the notations are the same.
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y located at x from joining either mobile network i or j is, respectively, given
by:
y + v0 − tx2 + ω(pi, Ri)− pid(pi, Ri) + ω̃(Pi, ri)− riDi(Pi, ri)− fi (3.83)
y + v0 − t(1− x)2 + ω(pj, Rj)− pjd(pj, Rj) + ω̃(Pj, rj)− rjD(Pj, rj)− fj
(3.84)
Disregarding fixed utilities, let’s define net variable consumer surplus wi as:
wi ≡ω(pi, Ri)− pi · d(pi, Ri)
+ ω̃(Pi, ri)− ri ·D(Pi, ri)− fi, i = 1, 2. (3.85)
Even though the definition of wi is different from the CPP model, the market







i = 1, 2 (3.86)
The profit functions of the mobile networks and the fixed-line network
are:
πi ≡si (pi − co − θiτ) · d(pi, Ri) + si
(
ri − ct − (1−Θi)τ
) ·D(Pi, ri)










Ri − CT − (1− θi)τ
) · d(pi, Ri)
}
+ F − CF (3.88)
3.3.2 Market Equilibrium
Suppose that the meet-points are arranged symmetrically before the
networks compete in their retail market. This symmetry is reasonable be-
cause arranged meet-points are highly likely to be detected by the third party,
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including a potential regulator.11
θ1 = θ2 = θ (3.89)
Θ1 = Θ2 = Θ (3.90)
In this case, the fixed-line monopoly network will choose its retail prices by
the regulation schedule:





R2 = R2 = g
(
CT + (1− θ)τ) = R
On the other hand, each mobile network chooses retail tariff, pi, ri and













t + (1−Θ)τ = r∗ (3.92)
The equilibrium fixed-fee is:
fi = c
f + 2t · si, i = 1, 2 (3.93)
Combining the above equilibrium retail tariff and consumer surplus for mobile




, i = 1, 2 (3.94)
11See Atkinson and Barnekov (2001).
12See Chapter 2 for details.
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Now, let’s go back to equilibrium fixed-fee and consumer surpluses:
f ∗1 = f
∗
2 =c




∗, R) + ω̃(P, r∗)− p∗ · d(p∗, R)− r∗ ·D(P, r∗)− f ∗ = w∗
(3.96)
By putting all the solutions into the profit function (3.87), the equilib-





= π∗, i = 1, 2 (3.97)
The equilibrium profit of the perfectly regulated fixed-line network is zero.
Π∗ = 0 (3.98)
The mobile network consumer’s net surplus is:
w∗ = ω(p∗, R) + ω̃(P, r∗)− p∗ · d(p∗, R)− r∗ ·D(P, r∗)− f ∗ (3.99)
The fixed-line network consumer’s net surplus in equilibrium is:
W ∗ =
{




Ω̃(p∗, R)−R · d(p∗, R)
}
− F (3.100)
As in the CPP model, social welfare is defined as the sum of the profits and
consumer surpluses of the fixed-line and mobile networks. The equilibrium
social welfare is:
TS∗ = π∗ + w∗ + Π∗ + W ∗ (3.101)
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3.3.3 Optimal Meet-Points
In the market equilibrium under a Bill-and-Keep regime mobile firms
set their prices at cost level given symmetric meet-points, θi = θj = θ and
Θi = Θj = Θ and information about the relative size of the receivers’ utilities,
β and B.
From the efficient allocation conditions (3.24) and (3.25) in subsection
3.2.2,
U ′(Q̂) =






(co + τ + CT ) (3.103)
Assuming vanishing noise, the fixed-line network is regulated to set
retail prices by (3.61) and (3.62), given (Θ, θ). Now, suppose the regulator
sets the retail prices of the fixed-line network at cost level. In equilibrium,
g(CO + Θτ) =CO + Θτ (3.104)
g(CT + (1− θ)τ) =CT + (1− θ)τ (3.105)
By combining the above equations with efficient allocation conditions (3.102)
and (3.103),
CO + Θτ =P =
CO + τ + ct
(1 + β)
(3.106)
CT + (1− θ)τ =R = B
1 + B
(co + τ + CT ). (3.107)
Then the optimal meet-points are:
Θ̂ =








Notice that these optimal meet-points can be greater than 1 when β or B is
small enough. For example, examine the first equation (3.108). Since a small
β indicates a small receiver’s utility, optimality requires that the caller pay a
part of termination costs (ct) as well as the whole transport cost (τ).
If the regulator can apply the optimal meet-points corresponding to the
receiver’s utility, the Bill-and-Keep system yields a socially optimal market
equilibrium in which all prices are at cost level and the telecommunications
service is provided properly.
3.4 Practical Bill-and-Keep Policies
In this section, I use a simple model to evaluate two practical Bill-
and-Keep policies – COBAK and MBAK – by comparing them with the CPP
model. I apply linear demand functions and their indirect utility functions
and uniform distribution of receiver’s utility to the CPP and Bill-and-Keep
models from the previous sections. For the CPP model, I calculate the efficient
allocation using optimal access charges as well as market equilibrium. On
the other hand, for the Bill-and-Keep model, I calculate market equilibria




For the simplicity of analysis, I assume that the relative size of the
receiver’s utility to the caller’s utility is the same for fixed-to-mobile calls and
mobile-to-fixed calls: β = B. Practical Bill-and-Keep policies are suggested
assuming a certain level of β. MBAK assumes a symmetric distribution over
the division of benefits between caller and receiver, which means that E(β)=1.
In this study, I do not adhere to any specific level of β to evaluate the two
practical Bill-and-Keep policies in a more general environment. I choose mul-
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tiple points of β between 0 and 1.5 at regular intervals.13 For each regime, I
calculate the equilibrium result, including the total surplus at each level of β.
First, I explain the functions used in this section and for clarity define
several concepts of the regimes. Second, I explain the effects of noise and small
values of β. Third, I compare practical Bill-and-Keep policies with the optimal
Bill-and-Keep system. Fourth, I compare COBAK and MBAK. Finally, I will
explain the effect of cost structure.
3.4.1 Example Model and Definitions
In this simulation, I use this linear specification of demand.
Example 1. (Linear Demands with Uniformly Distributed Noise)
Assume that all demand functions in the CPP model from Section 3.2 and the
Bill-and-Keep model in Section 3.3 are linear.
Q(P ) = m0 − P
q(p) = n0 − p, n0 > m0 > 0
where n0 > m0 assuming that demand for mobile-to-fixed calls q is greater than
demand for fixed-to-mobile calls Q at a price level. When the welfare effect of
noise in the receiver’s utility is considered, it is important whether demands
are big or small for a given support of the noise.14 See Lemma 9 in the next
subsection.
13I change this β = B from 0.05 to 1.5 by increments of 0.05. This range is reasonable if
we accept that the cases of negative receiver’s utility are negligibly rare and that it’s unlikely
that the receiver’s utility is significantly higher than the caller’s utility. Even if I increase
the upper bound of the range, the basic results of this paper do not change.
14I use m0 = 18 and n0 = 22 for large demand for a given support [−b, b] of the noise.
To show a case of small demand, I use m0 = 5.5 and n0 = 6.5, which correspond to almost
minimum level of utilities to guarantee positive call volumes: D > 0 and d > 0,∀ β ≥ 0.05.
See Lemma 10 in the next section.
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Since I assume B = β, receivers’ utilities are:
ũ(Q) + εQ = βU(Q) + εQ
Ũ(q) + εq = βu(q) + εq.
The noise in the receiver’s utility, ε, is assumed to be uniformly distributed on





for − b ≤ ε ≤ b, b > 0
0 otherwise.
The cost structures are assumed to be asymmetric between the fixed-line
network and the mobile networks16: the costs of mobile networks are higher
than those of the fixed-line networks and termination costs are higher than
origination costs.
ct > co > CT > CO
Using the above sample model, meet-points which maximize the equi-
librium total surplus TS∗ in equation (3.101) can be derived in closed forms.
Lemma 8. (Adjusted Optimal Meet-Points) Using a linear specification
of demand and a uniform distribution with a support [−b, b], one can obtain
“adjusted optimal meet-points,” which maximize the equilibrium social welfare
given the value of the receiver’s utility β :
Θ̃ =













15b = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 are used to see how the support of noise works in this model. Otherwise,
I use b = 0.4, which is close to the minimum support of noise for β ∈ [0, 1.5], to guarantee
both regions for caller and receiver, meaning that either party has a positive probability of
hanging up first.
16Here is a typical example of the asymmetric cost structure used in this simulation.
CO = 0.07 CT = 0.08 co = 0.12 ct = 0.13 τ = 0.1
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Due to the simplicity of the uniform distribution, these can be obtained easily.
Under a more complicated distribution, such as normal distribution, it’s dif-
ficult to obtain them in closed forms. I examine the implication of “adjusted
optimal meet-points” in the next subsection, after I explain the effect of noise
in receiver’s utility on the social welfare under a Bill-and-Keep regime.
To explain my simulation results, I define some concepts which will be
used from now on.
Definition 1. Optimal Bill-and-Keep means that the optimal meet-points
in equations (3.108) and (3.109) are used between interconnecting networks
under a Bill-and-Keep regime : Θ̂ and θ̂. See subsection 3.3.3.
Definition 2. Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep means that the “adjusted
optimal meet-points” in equations (3.110) and (3.111) are used between inter-
connecting networks under a Bill-and-Keep regime: Θ̃ and θ̃. See Lemma 8.
Definition 3. Practical Bill-and-Keep means that a common meet-point is
used between interconnecting networks under a Bill-and-Keep regime. “Prac-
tical” implies that these meet-points are suggested as implementable policies.
• COBAK means a Bill-and-Keep regime which uses a common meet-
point θC = ΘC = 1. All transport costs are paid by the calling network.
• MBAK means a Bill-and-Keep regime which uses a common meet-point
θM = ΘM = 1
2
. Both interconnecting networks divide and pay transport
costs equally.
Definition 4. Optimal CPP means that optimal access charges in equations
(3.56) and (3.55) are used between interconnecting networks under a CPP
regime. See subsection 3.2.4.
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Definition 5. Market CPP means that mobile access charges are not regu-
lated nor arranged by the interconnecting networks under a CPP regime. Ac-
cess charges as well as retail tariffs are determined by each mobile network
independently so that mobile access charges are above cost. However, the ac-
cess charges and retail tariff of the fixed-line network are regulated at cost level.
See subsection 3.2.3.
3.4.2 Noise and Small β
In Chapter 2, the efficiency of optimal Bill-and-Keep is shown theo-
retically assuming a “vanishing noise” in the receiver’s utility. However, in
Example 1 with a “non-vanishing noise,” the existence of noise affects social
welfare under a Bill-and-Keep regime: the noise in receiver’s utility affects
equilibrium through receiver’s price, and equilibrium social welfare depends
on the size of support of the noise. Under a CPP regime, since networks do
not charge their subscribers for receiving calls, equilibrium does not depend
on the size of the support.17 I summarize the noise effect on social welfare
with this lemma:
Lemma 9. (Effect of Noise on Social Welfare under Bill-and-Keep)
As the noise in the receiver’s utility has a bigger support [−b, b], social welfare
under a Bill-and-Keep regime decreases if β < 1 and increases slightly if β > 1.
(i) If the size of the demands relative to b is large enough, this noise effect
is negligible. See Figure B.1 in B.
(ii) Even though the size of the demands relative to b is small, the noise effect
17See Section 3.2 for details.
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decreases as β increases. But as β is closer to zero, the negative effect
of noise increases. See Figure B.2 in B.
See Appendix A for an explanation of Lemma 9. This lemma implies that if
the demands are large enough for a given support of noise, the Bill-and-Keep
regime should not be affected by the noise effect. Figures B.1 and B.2 in B
show total surplus levels of the Optimal Bill-and-Keep for three values of b.
It also compares them with Optimal CPP and Market CPP. In Figure B.1,
the Optimal Bill-and-Keep keeps its superiority to the Market CPP, and it
converges to the Optimal CPP for large demands. In Figure B.2, however,
for small demands with high b, the Optimal Bill-and-Keep is inferior to even
Market CPP when β is close to zero. Even with optimal meet-points, the
Bill-and-Keep can be worse than the CPP in some extreme but possible cases.
Even though there exists a noise effect that hurts the social welfare, it is
mainly a “small receiving-utility” or “small β” that makes the Bill-and-Keep
worse than the CPP. The noise effect only creates an “additional” negative
effect on social welfare.
Lemma 10. (“Small β” Effect) As β approaches zero, in a symmetric equi-
librium under a Bill-and-Keep regime, call volume and total surplus approach
to zero, too.
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to Figure B.2 in B, even the Optimal Bill-and-Keep cannot avoid
the “small β” effect so that social welfare is less than under Market CPP, if β
is close to zero. In Chapter 2 I show that with optimal meet-points, a Bill-and-
Keep regime is always superior to Market CPP if β > 0. These results appear
95
to contradict each other. But, in Chapter 2 I assume a vanishing noise and
does not take into consideration the existence of noise in equilibrium. On the
other hand, this simulation incorporates noise in the model, and the negative
effect of noise reduces the optimality of the Optimal Bill-and-Keep.
Now, it’s time to go back to the “adjusted optimal meet-points” in
Lemma 8. The second term of each equation shows that it is necessary to
adjust the relative burdens of the caller and receiver to maximize the total
surplus in a noise economy. I summarize two properties of the adjusted optimal
meet-points with this lemma:
Lemma 11. (Properties of Adjusted Optimal Meet-Points) Θ̃ and θ̃
in Lemma 8 have the following properties:
(i) If b approaches zero, the “adjusted optimal meet-points” approach the
optimal meet-points (3.108) and (3.109), which are obtained by the effi-
cient allocation of a social planner assuming vanishing noise.
Θ̂ =
ct − βCO + τ
τ(1 + β)
θ̂ =
CT −Bco + τ
τ(1 + B)
(ii) When the receiver’s expected utility is smaller than the caller’s utility
(β < 1), the support size of the receiver’s utility, b, favors the receiver.18
Adjusted optimal meet-points (Θ̃, θ̃) require the caller to pay more than
at optimal meet-points (Θ̂, θ̂). Conversely, when the receiver’s expected
utility is greater than the caller’s utility (β > 1), the support size of the
18The size of support for this uniform distribution implies its “variance”. For a uniform
distribution with a support [−b, b], its variance is b23 .
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receiver’s utility, b, favors the caller. (Θ̃, θ̃) require the receiver to pay
more than (Θ̂, θ̂).
Θ̃ > Θ̂ and θ̃ > θ̂ if β < 1
Θ̃ = Θ̂ and θ̃ = θ̂ if β = 1
Θ̃ < Θ̂ and θ̃ < θ̂ if β > 1
For the “adjusted optimal meet-points,” there is no noise effect in my simu-
lation. If Θ̃ and θ̃ are used under a Bill-and-Keep regime, namely “Adjusted
Optimal Bill-and-Keep,” the noise effect is mitigated by the adjustment terms
in equations (3.110) and (3.111).19 See Figure B.3 and B.4 in B. Whether the
demands are big or small, the Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep is always su-
perior to the Market CPP. Furthermore, the Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep
quickly approaches the Optimal CPP as β increases. For future reference, I
summarize the relation between the Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep and the
CPP with the following proposition.
Proposition 7. (Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep and CPP) (i) If
β > 0, the Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep is superior to the Market CPP.
(ii) The Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep quickly approaches the Optimal CPP
as β increases, because it recovers the negative welfare effect of noise.
In my simulation, if adjusted optimal meet-points are used, the superi-
ority of Optimal Bill-and-Keep to CPP is not violated. So, in this paper I use
the “adjusted optimal meet-points” (Θ̃, θ̃) in equations (3.110) and (3.111)
19Following the explanation in A, one can say that decreasing calling-surplus is almost
compensated by increasing receiving-surplus due to the adjustment term when the adjusted
optimal meet-points are used. A simulation using Example 1 supports this argument.
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instead of the optimal meet-points (Θ̂, θ̂) in equations (3.108) and (3.109)
whenever they are necessary.
3.4.3 Practical Bill-and-Keep versus Optimal Bill-and-Keep
Since regulators do not have sufficient information about the costs of
networks, the optimal meet-points are difficult to obtain. However, the trans-
port costs between the two central offices of the calling and the called network
are relatively easy to detect by the third party.20 Due to this, a regulator
can divide the transport cost and make both networks pay their own portions.
Conceptually a meet-point is a point at which the transport cost is divided.
So, practically possible meet-points are normalized to [0, 1]. I call these meet-
points “practical meet-points.” The COBAK suggests a practical meet-point,
ΘC = θC = 1 and the MBAK suggests ΘM = θM = 1
2
. In this subsection, I
examine whether a Practical Bill-and-Keep can achieve a better social welfare
level than a Market CPP. The results will shed light on the applicability of a
Bill-and-Keep in the real world.
Lemma 12. (Practical Bill-and-Keep and Adjusted Optimal Bill-
and-Keep) Practical Bill-and-Keep approaches the Adjusted Optimal Bill-
and-Keep as β increases.
As β increases, the size of the receiving-utility increases : ũ = βU(Q)
and Ũ = βu(q). This means that the total utility increases as β increases.
A practical meet-point cannot be better than the optimal meet-point, but
the effects of various meet-points on the social welfare are almost the same
when the total utility is sufficiently large. In B, see Figures B.5 and B.6 for
20See Atkinson and Barnekov (2001) for the details.
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COBAK and Figures B.7 and B.8 for MBAK. As β increases, Practical Bill-
and-Keep approaches the Adjusted Bill-and-Keep quicker for the case of large
demand than for small demand. The following proposition summarizes the
relationships between Practical Bill-and-Keep and CPP.
Proposition 8. (Practical Bill-and-Keep and CPP) (i) Practical Bill-
and-Keep provides a social welfare closer to Optimal CPP as β increases. (ii)
Practical Bill-and-Keep gives a better social welfare than Market CPP if β is
not too small.
This is implied by Proposition 7 and Lemma 12. Figure B.5 and B.6
show that COBAK is superior to Market CPP if β is not too small. When
demand is small given the support size b, it’s more likely that COBAK cannot
enhance the social welfare over Market CPP. However, when demand is suffi-
ciently large, COBAK is very likely to be superior to Market CPP. Figure B.7
and B.8 show the same results for MBAK.
3.4.4 COBAK versus MBAK
Often regulators do not have any information about β as well as costs
of networks. So, it’s not easy to justify an assumed level of β as in MBAK.
In this subsection, without assuming a specific value of β, I examine which
Practical Bill-and-Keep is the best.
Using Example 1, Figures B.9 and B.10 in B compare how the total
surplus changes under MBAK (θM = ΘM = 1
2
) and COBAK (θC = ΘC = 1).
While for large demand the difference between MBAK and COBAK is not
clear, for small demand the superiority of COBAK to MBAK is clear when β
is close to zero. Figures B.11 and B.12 in B illustrate this clearly. They show
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the welfare gain of the Practical Bill-and-Keep over Market CPP. Especially for
values of β close to zero, the superiority of COBAK is clear. As β increases
the difference between MBAK and COBAK disappears. The superiority of
COBAK for small β is important because there is possibility that a Practical
Bill-and-Keep generates a worse social welfare situation than a Market CPP
for small β and small demand. To reduce the possibility that a Practical Bill-
and-Keep fails to improve the social welfare, COBAK should be chosen over
MBAK. This result does not depend on cost structure.21
Lemma 13. (COBAK vs MBAK) There exists a β̄ such that if β < β̄,
COBAK is more efficient than MBAK and if β > β̄, MBAK is more efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 9. (Superiority of COBAK to MBAK) COBAK is a safer
Practical Bill-and-Keep than MBAK.
Proof. By Proposition 8, every Practical Bill-and-Keep approaches the Op-
timal CPP as β increases. However, by Lemma 13, COBAK is superior to
MBAK for small β which is close to zero. So, if a Bill-and-Keep is going to be
introduced, it is safer to choose COBAK.
3.4.5 Symmetric versus Asymmetric Costs
Regulators do not have cost information about the networks, especially
origination and termination costs. It is practically easy for a regulator to set a
21See Figures B.15 and B.16 to compare the cases of symmetric and asymmetric cost
structure between fixed-line and mobile networks. They use Example 2 for asymmetric
costs and Example 3 for symmetric costs in the next section. They show the superiority of
COBAK for any case.
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symmetric meet-point for both call directions – fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-
fixed: Θ = θ. COBAK and MBAK are examples of just that. These symmetric
practical meet-points work better when the cost structure between the inter-
connecting networks is symmetric. To illustrate that, I use the following two
examples:
Example 2. (Asymmetric Costs) All other settings are the same as in
Example 1 except the following. First, the demands are symmetric:
Q = m0 − P
q = n0 − p, n0 = m0 > 0
Second, for each network, origination cost is equal to termination cost.
co = ct > CO = CT
Example 3. (Symmetric Costs) All other settings are the same as in Ex-
ample 2 except the symmetric cost structure between fixed-line and mobile net-
works:
co = ct = CO = CT
The only difference between the above two examples is the cost struc-
ture between the fixed-line and mobile networks. Figures B.13 and B.14 in B
compare symmetric and asymmetric cost structures for COBAK and MBAK
using Example 2 and 3. They show a difference in total surplus between a
Practical Bill-and-Keep and the Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep for symmet-
ric and asymmetric cost structures. For both COBAK and MBAK, it’s obvious
that the symmetric cost structure is better than the asymmetric one, but the
difference is very small.
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Lemma 14. (Symmetry and Practical Bill-and-Keep) Suppose the de-
mands for both networks are symmetric (n0 = m0) and for each network the
origination cost is the same as the termination cost (co = ct = c, CO =
CT = C). There exists a β for which the symmetric cost structure (c = C)
between the interconnecting networks makes a Practical Bill-and-Keep an op-
timal meet-point policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
For some values of β, the cost symmetry makes a Practical Bill-and-Keep
an optimal meet-point policy but this does not apply for cost asymmetry.
However, this result completely depends on the assumptions for β = B. If β
is different for the two directions of calls, fixed-to-mobile or mobile-to-fixed,
symmetry in cost structure cannot benefit a Practical Bill-and-Keep since
Θ̂ 6= θ̂. Furthermore, cost structure – symmetry or asymmetry – does not
make a big difference in the welfare gain of a Practical Bill-and-Keep over
Market CPP. In B, see Figures B.15 and B.16 using Examples 2 and 3. They
show the welfare gains of COBAK and MBAK over Market CPP for each
cost structure. Even for the case of small demand, cost symmetry does not
significantly affect the performance of a Practical Bill-and-Keep.
3.5 Conclusion
In the previous chapter, I show that if regulators have access to informa-
tion about network costs and the receiver’s utility, an optimal Bill-and-Keep
regime can be introduced to replace the existing CPP regime to resolve the
problematic access markets and call externalities. Since this information is
difficult to obtain in the real world, two practical Bill-and-Keep regimes are
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suggested: COBAK and MBAK. They only use information about transport
costs, which is relatively easy to obtain. In this paper, using some example
models, I examine the applicability of those practical Bill-and-Keep policies
for a reasonable range of receiver’s utility.
First, I show that for a Bill-and-Keep regime to be superior to a CPP
regime, the receiver’s utility should be fairly large. When receiver’s utility is
small, a practical Bill-and-Keep regime might decrease total surplus over a
market-driven CPP. Second, I show that if a Bill-and-Keep regime is intro-
duced, COBAK is a safer policy than MBAK, because the performance of a
practical Bill-and-Keep approaches that of an optimal Bill-and-Keep as the
receiver’s utility increases. For small values of the receiver’s utility, COBAK
yields a greater total surplus than MBAK.
This paper shows that the performance of a practical Bill-and-Keep
regime depends significantly on the size of the receiver’s utility. Therefore,







I use a similar method as in Laffont et al. (1998a).
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that mobile network 1 corners the market,























From the FOCs of mobile firms, (1.38) and (1.39),
p1 = c
o + τ + CT
f1 = c
f + 2 · t−Q(P1)(a1 − ct)
and from equation (1.36),
π1 = Q(P1)(a1 − ct) + f1 − cf = 2 · t > 0.
On the other hand,
π2 = 0.
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i) Suppose a1 = a2. P1 = P2 by Pi = g(C




{v(p1)− v(p2)}+ {f2 − f1}
2t
Since π2 = 0, mobile network 2 has an incentive to set its tariff as
p2 = c
o + τ + CT
f2 = f1 + ε, ε > 0
to get almost half of the market share.
ii) Suppose a1 > a2. Since P1 > P2 due to (g
′ > 0), ũ(Q(P1)) <
ũ(Q(P2)). As a result, it’s easier for mobile network 2 to obtain positive
market share because its subscribers receive more calls (and greater utility)
relative to the subscribers of mobile network 1.
iii) Suppose a1 < a2. Since P1 < P2, ũ(Q(P1)) > ũ(Q(P2)). If the
difference between the two access charges is too large, it might be impossible
for mobile network 2 to get any positive market share by changing its retail
tariffs. However, at the first stage, mobile network 2 has an incentive to set
their access charge as:
a2 = a1 + ε, ε > 0.
Then, mobile network 2 can set retail tariffs to get a positive market share.
From i), ii) and iii), cornered-market equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, only shared-market equilibria can be
considered. In such an equilibrium, the marginal-cost pricing condition:
pi = c
o + τ + CT , i = 1, 2 (A.1)
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holds for both mobile networks, given (ai, aj; A,Pi, Pj, F ). For i = 1, 2 and





















pi − co − τ − CT
)




Combined with marginal-cost pricing for both networks, for both mobile net-
works these equations define “pseudo reaction functions”, wi = w
R
i (wj). For








Q(Pi)(ai − ct) + v(co + τ + CT ) + ũ(Q(Pi))− cf − t
}






, i = 1, 2 and i 6= j.












o + τ + CT . But the equilibrium is not
necessarily symmetric due to possible asymmetry in (Pi, Pj) or (ai, aj).
Let’s now examine the second-order conditions. Given access charges
(ai, aj, A), retail prices of the fixed-line network (Pi, Pj, F ), and network j’s
strategy (pj, wj ≡ v(pj) + ũ(Q(Pj))− fj), mobile network i’s best response is
pi = c
o + τ + CT , and therefore, keeping wj and pj fixed, network i’s profit, if




































+ v(co + τ + CT ) + ũ(Q(Pi))− wi − cf
}
.










Therefore mobile network i’s profit function is strictly concave, which means
that the equilibrium is at least a local maximum.
Therefore, the candidate equilibrium, which must satisfy two condi-
tions, (A.1) and (A.2), is indeed an unique equilibrium, given (ai, aj; A,Pi, Pj, F ).
Proof of Lemma 3. Let’s begin with the existence of an equilibrium. It
is known that any continuous function defined on a compact set attains a
maximum. Assuming that all utility functions and demand functions are con-
tinuous, profit function (1.46) is continuous in ai.
Assume there exists a maximum price, P̄ such that Q(P̄ ) = 0. Then,
by FOC (1.40), there exists a maximum access charge, ā such that P̄ = g(CO+
τ + ā). On the other hand, assume that β ≤ 1 so that a∗i ≥ ct.1. Therefore ai
is in a compact set, [ct, ā].
Since a continuous profit function (1.46) is defined on a compact set,
[ct, ā], there exists a maximum.
1See Proposition 1 for details.
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Now, let’s prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Rewrite equation
(1.47), the first order condition of the mobile network at the first stage. For


























Q(P ∗i ) +
(






= 0, i = 1, 2
(A.3)
This defines a reaction function ai = a
R


















Q(P ∗j ) +
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Q(P ∗i ) +
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due to the first order condition. They do not response to each other’s access
charges. Both mobile networks try to get as big a market share as possible no
matter what the rival networks’s access charge is. Therefore, unilaterally each
mobile network chooses its own optimal access charge a∗i which satisfies this
condition, for i = 1, 2,
Q(g(CO + τ + a∗i )) +
(




∂Q(g(CO + τ + a∗i ))
∂ai
= 0
since si 6= 0 and P ∗i = g(CO + τ + a∗i ). Because the demand function Q(·),
utility function ũ(·), and cost ct are the same for both networks, their access













































































It’s reasonable to say that ∂
2g
∂a2i
= 0 because the regulation schedule g(CO +


























by the concavity of utility function, ũ” = βU” < 0. In this case, mobile
network i’s profit function is strictly concave, which means that the equilibrium
is global maximum.
Therefore, there exists an unique and symmetric equilibrium in terms
of access charges, (a∗i = a
∗
j = a
∗), which must satisfy this condition,
Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)) +
(
a∗ − ct + ∂ũ(Qi)
∂Qi
)




With (a∗i = a
∗
j = a




for i = 1, 2.
Then, from equation (1.41) and above s∗i =
1
2
, equilibrium fixed prices become:
f ∗i = c
f + t− (a∗ − ct)Q(g(CO + τ + a∗)).
Proof of Lemma 5. Since si 6= 0, from equation (1.47), the FOC with
respect to ai, mobile network i choose the access charge a
∗





∂Q(g(CO + τ + a∗i ))
∂ai
+












is the effect of access charge ai on the call-





















∂g(CO + τ + a∗i )
∂ai
< 0.
Suppose β = 0. Since ∂ũ(Qi)
∂ai
= 0, above equation A.4 can be the follow-
ing. Let’s call it K(ai).
K(ai) ≡ Q(g(CO + τ + ai)) + (ai − ct)∂Q(g(C




This equation says that mobile networks choose monopoly level access charge
ami when the receiver’s utility is not taken into account.




Let’s show that as β increases from zero, mobile network i should decrease
its access charge from ami . Let’s take the first-order derivative of the above




∂Q(g(CO + τ + ai))
∂ai
+ (ai − ct)∂

























It’s reasonable to say that ∂
2g
∂a2i
= 0 because the regulation schedule g(CO + τ +
ai) is likely to be linear. Now, only one more condition is necessary to finish
the proof. Suppose that demand function Q(·) is linear or ∂2Q
∂P 2i




is zero and ∂K(ai)
∂ai
< 0.




comes in the equation (A.5) to make equation
(A.4). Since equation (A.5) is a negative function of ai, ai should be decreased
to keep the zero condition. Therefore a∗i < a
m
i should hold.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that mobile network 1 corners the market,
given symmetric meet-points (θ1 = θ2, Θ1 = Θ2). So, s1 = 1 and s2 = 0. Since
the meet-points are symmetric, the retail prices of the monopoly fixed-line
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network are decided symmetrically. From equations (2.2) and (2.3),





R1 = R2 = g(C
T + (1− θ)τ) = R.












ω(p1, R)− p1 · d(p1, R) + ω̃(P, r1)− r1 ·D(P, r1)− f1
2t
− ω(p2, R)− p2 · d(p2, R) + ω̃(P, r2)− r2 ·D(P, r2)− f2
2t
=1. (A.6)



























Since ε is assumed to have a sufficiently wide support [ε, ε̄],
Ψ(R−Bp1) 6= 1.
Since r1 = ũ





) = Q′(U ′(·)) 6= 0.
Considering p1 = u
′(·) (2.9) and r1 = ũ′(·) + ε (2.11), mobile network 1 sets
its retail prices at the cost level,
p1 =u
′(q) = co + θτ
r1 =ũ
′(Q) + ε = ct + (1−Θ)τ.
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By putting the above two equations and definition of net surplus wi (2.27) into
the FOC with respect to wi (2.46), one can find:
f1 = 2t + c
f .
From the profit function (2.43), the profit of mobile network 1 is:
π1 = 2t
On the other hand, since s2 = 0, mobile network 2 has no profit.
π2 = 0
Now, let’s consider the incentives of mobile network 2. From the market share




ω(p1, R)− ω(p2, R)− p1 · d(p1, R) + p2 · d(p2, R)
2t
+









Both mobile networks are assumed to have the same cost structures. Further-
more, their subscribers’ utility functions, ω(pi, R) and ω̃(P, ri), are the same.
They face the same demand functions, d(pi, R) and D(P, ri) because of sym-
metric meet-points and the symmetric retail prices of the fixed-line network.
Consequently the above equation (A.7) can be easily zero by adjusting
the tariff of any mobile firm so that s1 is almost
1
2
. Since π2 = 0, mobile







f2 = f1 + ε, ε > 0
to get slightly less than half of the whole market. Even so, since f2 > f1 and
s1 > s2, mobile network 1 does not have any incentive to deviate from this
state. Therefore, cornered market equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 6. After removing the common items in both equa-
tions (2.80) and (2.91), we must show:
{





















(1 + B)u(qcpp)− pcpp · qcpp + (1 + β)U(Qcpp)− P cpp ·Qcpp
}
. (A.9)
By Lemma 7, we know that if the receivers’ utilities are positive (B > 0 and
β > 0),
Q̂ ≡ Q(PBK) > Q(P cpp)
q̂ ≡ q(pBK) > q(pcpp)
Then, if the following equations hold, T̂ S
BK
> TScpp.
PBK + rBK ≤ P cpp
pBK + RBK ≤ pcpp
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Since am > ct if the receivers’ utilities are positive2, we know that:
PBK + rBK = CO + τ + ct < CO + τ + am = P cpp
pBK + RBK = co + τ + CT = co + τ + CT = pcpp
Therefore, T̂ S
BK
> TScpp holds if the receivers’ utilities are positive.
A Comment on the Noise Effect in Lemma 9
Given a meet-point level, total surplus decreases as the size of the
support of noise, [−b, b], increases, if β < 1. When demands are big enough
for a given support of noise, this noise effect can be ignored. Even though
demand is small for a given support of noise, the noise effect is not significant
for large values of β. However, for small values of β and small demand levels,
the negative effect of noise is significant. On the other hand, total surplus
increases very slightly as b increases, if β > 1. This is derived from the
properties of the utility functions which I assume in the Bill-and-Keep model:
only the receiver’s utility is subject to noise and the caller’s utility is not. So,
I want to focus on how utilities change as the support of noise changes.
In this model, the networks’ profits do not depend on the support of
the noise. The fixed-line network has no profit due to complete regulation
and the mobile networks have only Hotelling profit because of the competition
for subscribers. So, I therefore disregard the producer surpluses and focus
on the consumer surpluses. Furthermore, because the case of fixed-to-mobile
calls is symmetric with the case of mobile-to-fixed calls, I only explain the
fixed-to-mobile calls. In subsection 3.3.1, consumer surpluses from making
2See Chapter 1.
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and receiving calls are the following:
Ω(P, r)− PD(P, r)
ω̃(P, r)− rD(P, r)
At first, disregarding payments, let’s examine utilities. The utilities of the
callers and receiver are:
































For each equation, the first term is for a caller-region with large value of noise,
in which the caller determines call volume. The second term is for a receiver-
region with small value of noise, in which the receiver determines call volume.
Let’s begin with a small support, [ε, ε̄] = [−b0, b0]. When ε is realized
at the upper bound (ε = b0), call volume is highly likely to be determined by
the caller since the receiver’s marginal utility is high. Let’s say this caller-
determined volume is Q(b0):
Q(b0) ≡ Q(P )
With ε = b0, the caller’s and receiver’s utilities are:
U(Q(P )) and ũ(Q(P )) + b0Q(P )
When ε is realized at the lower bound (ε = −b0), call volume is likely to be
determined by the receiver, since the receiver’s marginal utility is low. Let’s
say this receiver-determined volume is Q(−b0):











))− b0Q(r + b0
β
)
Now, the support becomes the larger one, [ε, ε̄] = [−b1, b1], b1 > b0.
Even if ε is realized at the upper bound (ε = b1), caller-determined volume
Q(b1) does not change:
Q(b1) ≡ Q(P ) ≡ Q(b0)
Neither does the caller’s utility:
U(Q(P )) = U(Q(b1)) = U(Q(b0))
But the receiver’s utility is affected, because it includes ε. It increases since
b1 > b0:
ũ(Q(P )) + b1Q(P ) > ũ(Q(P )) + b0Q(P ) (A.10)
If ε is realized at the lower bound (ε = −b1), the receiver-determined volume
Q(−b1) is smaller than before:






So is the caller’s utility:





)) = U(Q(−b0)) (A.11)




))− b1q(r + b1
β
) (A.12)




than before. Since the change in the first term, ũ(q( r+b1
β
)), is likely to be
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greater than the change in the second term, b1q(
r+b1
β
), the receiver’s utility
decreases as b increases, but the negative term mitigates the decrease.
Summing up the above results: calling-utility Ω decreases as b increases
because the upper bound of it does not change and the lower bound of it
decreases as b increases. Receiving-utility ω̃ increases with b, because the
upper bound of it increases with b and the lower bound of it is likely to
decrease slightly.
Now, let’s see the change in the two payments: calling-payment and
receiving-payment. By the above logic, the call volume D(P, r) decreases as
b increases. Prices are determined at cost level given specific meet-points.
So, the payment amounts for making and receiving calls also decreases as b
increases. Apparently, receiving-surplus, ω̃(P, r)− rD(P, r), increases with b.
On the other hand, decreasing calling-utility is very likely to be dominant in
the effect of b even though decreasing calling-payment reduces the effect. So,
calling-surplus Ω(P, r)− PD(P, r) decreases as b increases.
For this linear specification of demand, the change in utility level is
likely to be greater than the change in quantity level. So, the decrease in
calling-utility is dominant in the whole effect of b on total surplus.
However, this is only when β is small. See equation (A.11). If β is
big, the change in calling-utility cannot be dominant since the noise effect is
discounted by a large β. On the other hand, increasing the receiving-utility has
a larger effect as β increases. See equation (A.10). Remember that ũ = βU .
β indicates the size of the receiving-utility. So, at some level of β, the effect
of increasing the receiving-utility begins to dominate the decreasing calling-
utility.
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With a linear specification of demand and uniform distribution in Ex-
ample 1, one can confirm the above arguments. If β is less than one, the
receiving-utility slightly increases with b, but the increase is dominated by
decreasing calling-utility. The change in payments cannot be larger than the
change in utilities. So the total surplus decreases as b increases, if β < 1.
However, the relative size of this negative effect of b decreases as β increases.
With β > 1, the b has a slight positive effect on the total surplus.
Using a normal distribution, one can see that the noise effect is weaker
since more weight is put around the center of the support. However, the basic
results of a model using uniform distribution are not changed using normal
distribution.
Proof of Lemma 10. In a symmetric equilibrium of the Bill-and-Keep model,
the profits of all networks do not depend on the support of the noise. So, I
consider only the effect of β on consumer surpluses. Because the case of
fixed-to-mobile calls is symmetric with the case of mobile-to-fixed calls, I only
explain the fixed-to-mobile calls. In subsection 3.3.1, the consumer surplus of
caller and receiver are:
Ω(P, r)− PD(P, r) (A.13)
ω̃(P, r)− rD(P, r) (A.14)
The utilities and call volumes are determined after the noise is determined.
Let’s examine the demands, first.









In the caller-region with large noise, the call volume is:
Q(P )





As β decreases and approaches zero, this receiver-region volume approaches
zero, too. It is irrelevant whether the value of the noise is high or low. Since
a smaller β increases the probability of the receiver-region, one can say that
the call demand D(P, r) goes to zero as β goes to zero.
The utilities are slightly different but fundamentally the same.
































In the caller-region, the utilities of the caller and the receiver are:
U(Q(P ))
βU(Q(P )) + εQ(P )
As β approaches zero, the receiving-utility approaches zero, too. On the other













The utilities of both the caller and the receiver approach zero as β approaches
zero. Combining the results of both regions, one can say that utilities of both
the caller and the receiver, Ω and ω̃ go to zero as β goes to zero.
Proof of Lemma 13. Before assuming β = B, the optimal meet-points are:
Θ̂ =
ct + τ − βCO
(1 + β)τ
θ̂ =
CT + τ −Bco
(1 + B)τ
Note that the optimal meet-point for each direction of calls – fixed-to-mobile
and mobile-to-fixed – might not be the same: Θ̂ 6= θ̂.








One can analyze the market for each direction of calls separately, since they
are not correlated in this model.3 So, as β (or B) increases from 0, first Θ = 1




) becomes so for a bigger β (B) for the fixed-to-mobile call market (for
the mobile-to-fixed call market). Let’s confirm it a different way.
If β = 0 and B = 0, the optimal meet-points are greater than the
3See Chapter 2.
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Using the formula of optimal meet-points, one can obtain the values of βθ=1







On the other hand, for the MBAK policy ( θ = Θ = 1
2
) to be an optimal



















One can see that:
βΘ=1 < βΘ= 1
2
Bθ=1 < Bθ= 1
2
This result reveals that as β (or B) increases from 0, first COBAK provides
the optimal surplus for a smaller β (B) and then MBAK provides the optimal
surplus with for a greater β (B) for the fixed-to-mobile call market (for the
mobile-to-fixed call market).
Now let’s assume β = B. Combining the two markets for both direc-
tions, the same relation between COBAK and MBAK clearly holds if CO = co
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and CT = ct since Θ̂ = θ̂. If the costs are different for fixed-line and mobile
network, neither of COBAK nor MBAK can be an optimal meet-point policy
for specific level of β. However, despite that, one can at least say that there
exists a value β̄ ∈ [βΘ=1, βΘ= 1
2
] that satisfies these conditions:
TSCOBAK > TSMBAK if β < β̄
TSCOBAK = TSMBAK if β = β̄
TSCOBAK < TSMBAK if β > β̄ (A.18)
where TS means total surplus.
Proof of Lemma 14. Suppose each network faces the same demand and the
origination cost is equal to the termination cost for each network.
n0 = m0
co = ct = c and CO = CT = C













If the costs are symmetric, namely c = C, the optimal meet-points are sym-
metric.
Θ̂ = θ̂
In this case, a Practical Bill-and-Keep can be an optimal policy for some
value of β, because it requires symmetric meet-points. For example, COBAK
requires:
ΘC = θC = 1
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There exists a value of β which makes COBAK an optimal policy.










By continuity, around this βC , COBAK can be an optimal policy.
On the other hand, if the costs are not symmetric, namely c 6= C,
optimal meet-points cannot be symmetric.
Θ̂ 6= θ̂
In this case, no Practical Bill-and-Keep would be an optimal policy because
they require symmetric meet-points.





Figure B.1: Optimal Bill-and-Keep and Support of Noise
























Figure B.2: Optimal Bill-and-Keep and Support of Noise (Small Demand)
























Figure B.3: Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep and Support of Noise



















Adj Opt B&K (b=0.4)
Adj Opt B&K (b=0.5)
Adj Opt B&K (b=0.6)
Market CPP
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Figure B.4: Adjusted Optimal Bill-and-Keep and Support of Noise (Small
Demand)
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Adj Opt B&K (b=0.5)
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Figure B.5: COBAK and Support of Noise






















Figure B.6: COBAK and Support of Noise (Small Demand)























Figure B.7: MBAK and Support of Noise






















Figure B.8: MBAK and Support of Noise (Small Demand)























Figure B.9: Practical Bill-and-Keep and Market CPP
























Figure B.10: Practical Bill-and-Keep and Market CPP (Small Demand)
























Figure B.11: Welfare Gain of Practical Bill-and-Keep






























Figure B.12: Welfare Gain of Practical Bill-and-Keep (Small Demand)































Figure B.13: Symmetric vs Asymmetric Costs : Difference from Optimality




























Figure B.14: Symmetric vs Asymmetric Costs : Difference from Optimality
(Small Demand)




























Figure B.15: Symmetric vs Asymmetric Costs : Difference from Market CPP
































Figure B.16: Symmetric vs Asymmetric Costs : Difference from Market CPP
(Small Demand)
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